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M any	philosophers	hold	out	hope	that	some	final	condition	on	knowledge	will	allow	us	to	overcome	the	limitations	of	the	classic	“justified	true	belief”	analysis.	The	most	popular	
intuitive	glosses	on	this	condition	frame	it	as	an	absence	of	epistemic 
coincidence	(accident,	luck).1	In	this	paper,	I	lay	the	groundwork	for	an	
explanationist	 account	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence	—	one	 according	 to	
which,	roughly,	beliefs	are	non-coincidentally	true	if	and	only	if	they	
bear	 the	right	sort	of	explanatory	 relation	 to	 the	 truth.	More	specifi-
cally,	I	defend	a	sufficient	explanationist	condition	for	epistemic	coin-
cidence	and	explore	avenues	for	development	of	a	sufficient	condition	
for	avoiding	such	coincidence.2
This	 paper	 contains	 both	 positive	 arguments	 for	 explanationism	
and	negative	arguments	against	its	competitors.	But	the	relationship	
between	these	elements	is	tighter	than	typical.	I	aim	to	show	not	only	
that	 explanationism	 is	 independently	 plausible,	 and	 superior	 to	 its	
competitors,	but	also	that	it	helps	make	sense	of	both	the	appeal	and	
the	failings	of	those	competitors.	In	service	of	this,	§1	provides	a	road-
map	of	the	paper	within	an	overarching	narrative	on	which	theorizing	
about	 epistemic	 coincidence	has	 trended	 in	 the	 right	 direction	—	to-
wards	explanationism	—	but	where	success	has	been	blocked	by	a	se-
ries	of	understandable	missteps.
1. Narrative Roadmap 
Causal	theories	(e.g.,	Goldman	1967)	were	amongst	the	earliest	post-
Gettier	 (1963)	 attempts	 to	analyze	knowledge.	Though	 they	are	not	
typically	presented	as	such,	we	can	easily	draw	from	them	an	account	
of	epistemic	coincidence.	Such	causationism	holds,	roughly,	that	beliefs	
are	non-coincidentally	 true	 if	 and	only	 if	 they	bear	 the	 right	 sort	of	
causal	relation	to	the	truth.
1.	 I	am	inclined	to	think	that	the	final	condition	just	is	an	anti-coincidence	con-
dition,	but	nothing	here	rests	on	that	claim.	
2.	 I	phrase	 it	 this	way,	 rather	 than	 in	 terms	of	a	necessary	 condition	 for	epis-
temic	coincidence,	because	I	find	it	more	intuitive,	but	obviously	the	two	are	
equivalent.
	 david	faraci Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence
philosophers’	imprint	 –		2		–	 vol.	19,	no.	4	(january	2019)
modal	 conditions:	 sensitivity considers	 whether	 our	 beliefs	 would	
have	tracked	the	truth	had	it	been	different;6 safety	considers	whether	
our	beliefs	track	the	truth	at	nearby	(i.e.,	similar)	worlds.7 
As	I	discuss	in	§5.1,	there	are	striking	similarities	between	sensitiv-
ity	(the	earliest	modal	condition)	and	simple	counterfactual	theories	
of	causation.	Given	this,	it	is	fruitful	to	think	of	at	least	early	modalism	
as	the	result	of	replacing	explicitly	causal	conditions	with	modal	con-
ditions	adapted	from	causal	models.
The	problem	here	is	simple:	if	causationism	fails	because	it	is	too	
narrow, and	modal	conditions	began	as	adapted	models	of	causal	rela-
tions,	we	should	expect	modalism	to	fail	for	the	same	reasons	of	nar-
rowness.	Indeed	it	does:	there	are	coincidence	contrasts	where	there	
are	no	differences	in	the	modal relations	between	the	beliefs	and	truth,	
as	 I	 show	 in	 §5.2.	What’s	more,	 as	we’ll	 see,	 there	 are	 important	 af-
finities	between	my	arguments	for	explanationism	in	§§3–4	and	this	
failing	of	modalism.	
A	natural	question	at	this	point	is	whether	modalism’s	narrowness	
is	a	result	of	the	appeal	to	counterfactuals	per se or	merely	of	a	modal	
semantics	 for counterfactuals.	 If	 the	 former,	 this	 would	 further	 sup-
port	explanationism.	But	defending	this	would	require	an	argument	
that	some	explanatory	relations	cannot	be	modeled	counterfactually.	
While	I	raise	some	concerns	in	§6.2,	I	offer	no	such	argument.	Instead,	
in	§6.1	I	examine	the	counterfactual	conditions	required	to	systematize	
our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence	(to	whatever	extent	they	
can).	I	argue	that	the	nature	and	variety	of	these	conditions	suggests	
that	the	intuitive	roots	of	our	judgements	concern	explanation	rather	
take	meeting	their	preferred	conditions	to	be	sufficient	for	avoiding	epistemic	
coincidence,	but	all	take	it	to	be	necessary.
6.	 The	original	sensitivity	condition	is	Nozick’s	(1981).	Note	that	Nozick	rejected	
the	relevance	of	sensitivity	to	knowledge	of	necessary	truths,	a	point	whose	
significance	will	become	clear	in	§5.
7.	 There	are	a	number	of	different	notions	of	“safety”	in	the	literature.	This	fram-
ing	echoes	Justin	Clarke-Doane’s	(2016),	whose	arguments	will	be	important	
in	§§4–5.	It	is	closer	—	though	not	identical	—	to	Williamson’s	(2002)	than	to	
Sosa’s	(1999b)	original	formulation.
If	coincidences	are	causal	phenomena,	cases	cannot	differ	in	coinci-
dence-status without	differing	causally.	This	anticipates	two	problems	
for	causationism.	First,	 there	are	coincidence contrasts	—	pairs	of	cases,	
one	intuitively	coincidental,	the	other	non-coincidental	—	where	there	
are	no	causal	relations	at	all	between	the	beliefs	and	the	truth.	This	
shows	 that	an	absence	of	 causal	 connection	 is	neither	 sufficient	 for	
epistemic	coincidence	nor	sufficient	for	avoiding	it.	Second,	there	are	
arguably	coincidence	contrasts	where	the	causal	relations	in	both	cases	
are	the	same. If	so,	then	no	particular	causal	relation	allows	us	to	avoid	
epistemic	coincidence.	This	takes	us	through	§2.	
My	view	is	 that	 the	first	of	causationism’s	problems	is	a	result	of	
its	narrowness.3	Causation	is	but	one	kind	of	explanation,	and	I	claim	
that	focusing	on	the	broader	class	of	explanatory	relations	allows	us	
to	develop	a	superior	sufficient	condition	for	epistemic	coincidence.4 I 
introduce	such	a	condition	in	§3	and	argue	that	it	avoids	the	problem	
in	question	in	§4.	
The	literature	has	not	followed	me	in	this.	Rather,	the	most	popu-
lar	 accounts	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence	have	been	 forms	of	modalism. 
Modalism	holds,	roughly,	that	beliefs	are	non-coincidentally	true	just	
in	case	they	track	the	truth	across	some	appropriate	set	of	metaphysi-
cally	possible	worlds.5	The	primary	focus	has	been	two	(families	of)	
3.	 It	is	not	hard	to	see	how	this	narrowing	might	have	occurred:	in	everyday	life,	
we	tend	to	focus	on	causal	relations,	and	this	can	make	it	tempting	for	non-
philosophers	(and	some	philosophers)	to	think	of	all	explanation	as	causal	
explanation.	
4.	 I	do	not	here	offer	an	account	of	the	boundary	between	causal	and	non-caus-
al	explanation.	For	our	purposes,	all	that	matters	is	that	there	is	an	intuitive	
distinction	here,	and	that	at	least	some	explanatory	relations	are	hyperinten-
sional.	The	latter	helps	explain	the	failings	of	modalism	exposed	in	§5:	differ-
ences	in	coincidence-status	outstrip	modal	differences	because	extensional	
and	intensional	equivalents,	like	89’s	being	prime	and	its	being	a	Fibonacci	
number,	can	differ	in	their	explanatory	relations	to	our	beliefs.
5.	 Proponents	 of	modal	 conditions	 include	 Black	 (2008),	 Black	 and	Murphy	
(2007),	Clarke-Doane	(2012,	2014,	2015,	2016),	DeRose	(1995),	Dretske	(1971),	
Ichikawa	 (2011),	 Luper-Foy	 (1984),	 Nozick	 (1981),	 Pritchard	 (2007,	 2009),	
Roush	 (2005),	Sainsbury	 (1997),	Sosa	 (1999a,	 1999b,	2007,	2009),	 and	Wil-
liamson	(2002),	among	others.	It	is	not	always	clear	whether	these	authors	
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issues	beyond	epistemology,	then	conclude	with	a	brief	discussion	of	
how	they	relate	to	where,	autobiographically,	they	began:	with	a	fun-
damental	epistemological	challenge	in	metaethics.	
2. Two Failures of Causationism
Begin	with	a	classic	Gettier	case:8
Bad Clock	 	 	 Bertie	wants	 to	 know	what	 time	 it	 is.	 She	
consults	her	kitchen	clock,	which	she	has	been	using	for	
years,	and	which	has	 typically	been	accurate.	The	clock	
reads	“10:00”.	And	it	is	indeed	10:00.	But	the	clock	reads	
this	because	it	stopped	exactly	twelve	hours	ago.
It	is	common	to	explain	the	import	of	Bad Clock	as	follows:	It	seems	
clear	that	knowledge	requires	more	than	true	belief;	a	lucky	guess	is	
not	knowledge.	It	is	tempting	to	think	the	missing	element	is	doxastic	
justification:	it	needs	to	be	reasonable	for	Bertie	to	form	her	belief	the	
way	she	does.	But	cases	like	Bad Clock	show	that	this	isn’t	enough.	It	
is	perfectly	reasonable	to	form	beliefs	by	consulting	a	historically	accu-
rate	kitchen	clock.	Yet,	as	in	this	case,	it	can	be	a	mere	coincidence	that	
a	justified	belief	is	true;	a	stopped	clock	is	right	only	twice	a	day,	and	
Bertie	just	happened to	consult	it	at	one	of	those	moments.9
What	 precisely	 makes	 this	 and	 others	 cases	 of	 epistemic	 coinci-
dence?	 It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 ‘coincidence’	 is	 not	meant	 to	 be	
a	 term	of	 art	here,	but	 rather	 serves	 to	 reflect	 common,	pretheoreti-
cal	intuitions	about	what’s	gone	wrong	in	Gettier	cases.	Given	this,	it	
is	 appropriate	 to	 begin	 our	 philosophical	 theorizing	with	 a	 diction-
ary	definition:	a	coincidence	 is	“a	remarkable	concurrence	of	events	
8.	 That	is:	a	case	of	justified	true	belief	that	fails	to	be	knowledge.	Note	that	not	
only	justified	beliefs	can	exhibit	epistemic	coincidence;	merely	true	beliefs	
can	as	well.	I	focus	on	Gettier	cases	to	avoid	concerns	that	the	intuitive	fail-
ures	of	knowledge	I	focus	on	are	non-coincidental	failures	of	justification.
9.	 This	 is	 a	variation	on	a	 case	 from	Russell	 (1948),	which	 (as	 I	 am	not	even	
vaguely	close	to	being	the	first	to	note)	is	a	far	more	elegant	case	of	justified	
true	belief	that	fails	to	be	knowledge	than	those	offered	by	Gettier	himself,	
but	which	Russell	did	not	frame	as	such.	
than	counterfactuals	directly.	(I	refer	to	the	view	that	the	relevant	intu-
itions	do	concern	counterfactuals	directly	as	“counterfactualism”.)
Again,	 the	 literature	 has	 not	 followed	me	 in	 this.	Many	 philoso-
phers	treat	counterfactual	conditions	as	direct	representatives	of	the	
intuitions	 behind	 our	 judgements	 about	 epistemic	 coincidence.	 In-
deed,	 the	 literature	 has	 shifted	 towards	 conditions,	 like	 safety,	 that	
look	less	 like	adapted	explanatory	models	and	more	like	representa-
tives	of	a	directly	counterfactual	notion	of	coincidence.
This	shift	can	be	—	and	I	suspect	has	been	to	some	extent,	though	
the	issue	is	not	typically	framed	this	way	—	motivated	by	the	second	
problem	for	causationism	and,	by	extension,	explanationism:	the	ex-
istence	 of	 coincidence	 contrasts	 where	 all	 explanatory	 relations	 be-
tween	beliefs	and	truth	appear	to	be	the	same.	The	most	famous	ex-
ample	here	is	Goldman’s	(1976)	fake	barn	case,	which	he	himself	takes	
to	undermine	his	earlier	causal	theory:	an	agent	actually sees a barn, but	
the	presence	of	barn-façades	in	the	area	renders	her	belief	coinciden-
tally	true.	The	problem	for	both	causationism	and	explanationism	is	
that	this	agent’s	belief	seems	to	be	explained	by	the	barn	in	exactly	the	
same	way	that	it	would	be	in	a	non-coincidental	case	where	there	are	
no	barn-façades	around.	This	helps	motivate	the	idea	that	the	funda-
mental	problem	in	such	cases	isn’t	an	absence	of	explanatory	connec-
tion,	causal	or	otherwise,	but	rather	(in	keeping	with	safety)	that	the	
relevant	beliefs	almost failed	to	be	true.
In	§7,	I	argue	that,	despite	initial	appearances,	there	are	promising	
explanationist	strategies	for	distinguishing	cases	like	Goldman’s	from	
non-coincidental	cousins.	This	leaves	open	the	possibility	that	expla-
nationists	can	develop	a	sufficient	condition	for	avoiding	epistemic	co-
incidence.	What’s	more,	I	argue	that	explanationism	is	well-positioned	
both	 to	 solve	 certain	puzzles	 about	 cases	 like	Goldman’s	 and	 to	 ex-
plain	why	those	puzzles	have	seemed	insoluble	given	counterfactual-
ism	—	explanations	that	echo	my	arguments	against	counterfactualism	
from	§6.1.
In	§8,	I	very briefly	consider	how	my	arguments	relate	to	two	sup-
posed	reasons	for	skepticism	about	the	analysis	of	knowledge,	and	to	
	 david	faraci Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence
philosophers’	imprint	 –		4		–	 vol.	19,	no.	4	(january	2019)
This	is	a	serious	enough	problem	as	it	stands,	but	for	our	purposes	
it	will	be	useful	to	adapt	it	as	a	threat	to	causationist	accounts	of	epis-
temic	coincidence in	particular.	To	begin,	note	that	one	could claim	that	
where	causal	connections	are	impossible,	coincidences	are	impossible	
or	questions	of	coincidence	simply	don’t	apply,	and	thus	all	relevant	
cases	 are	non-coincidental.	 (This	 anticipates	 a	 problematic	modalist	
strategy	discussed	in	§5.1.)	But	this	won’t	do,	because	we	intuitively	
mark	 coincidence	 contrasts involving	 truths	 that	bear	no	 causal	 rela-
tions	to	our	beliefs:	sometimes	our	mathematical	and	ethical	beliefs	
are	coincidentally	true;	sometimes	they	aren’t.	For	example:
Bad Math			Leo	comes	to	believe	that	89	is	a	prime	num-
ber	because	he	looks	at	a	list	labeled	“Some	Prime	Num-
bers”	in	a	historically	accurate	mathematics	textbook	and	
sees	"89".	As	it	happens,	this	is	a	mislabeled	list	of	some	
Fibonacci	numbers.	[89	is	a	Fibonacci	prime.]
Good Math	 	 	 Lisa	 comes	 to	 believe	 that	 89	 is	 a	 prime	
number	 because	 she	 goes	 through	 its	 possible	 factors	
and,	through	accurate	calculation,	determines	that	89	has	
precisely	two	factors:	1	and	itself.
Intuitively,	 Bad Math	 is	 a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence,	 while	
Good Math	 is	not.13	Given	the	common	assumption	that	facts	about	
which	numbers	 are	prime	are	 causally	 impotent,	 there	 is	 simply	no	
way	for	causationists	to	vindicate	both	judgements.	
I	will	call	contrasts	 like	that	between	Bad Math	and	Good Math 
“no-causal-connection	 coincidence	 contrasts”,	 or	 “no-cause	 contrasts”	
for	 short.	 The	 existence	 of	 no-cause	 contrasts	 illuminates	 a	 funda-
mental	 problem	 for	 causationism:	 differences	 in	 coincidence-status	
13.	 One	could	claim	that	Bad Math	is	a	case	of	unjustified	belief,	but	this	surely	
need	not	be	so;	indeed,	I	stipulated	that	Leo’s	textbook	was	historically	accu-
rate	precisely	to	help	alleviate	this	concern.	Perhaps	one	could	also	build	de-
tails	into	Good Math	to	make	it	seem	coincidental	—	say,	if	Lisa	thought	that	
any	number	that	has	1	as	a	factor	is	a	prime	number;	again,	this	is	irrelevant,	
since	the	point	here	is	just	to	show	that	relevant	contrasts	are	possible.
or	circumstances	without	apparent	causal	connection”.10	And,	indeed,	
this	isn’t	a	bad	start	for	distinguishing	Bad Clock	from	non-coinciden-
tal	 cousins.	 Bertie’s	 belief	 is	 caused	by	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 clock	 reads	
“10:00”.	But	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 10:00	does	not	cause	 the	clock	 to	read	
this;	whatever	caused	it	to	stop	at	10:00	last	night	does.	By	contrast,	
in	a	version	of	the	case	where	the	clock	is	still	working,	there	is	surely	
some	connection11	between	the	fact	that	it	is	10:00	and	the	clock’s	read-
ing	“10:00”,	which	 in	turn	causes	Bertie	 to	believe	—	now,	seemingly,	
know	—	that	it	is	10:00.	This	makes	it	both	fitting	and	unsurprising	that	
causal	theories	were	amongst	the	first	deployed	in	efforts	to	solve	the	
Gettier	problem	—	though	these	were	typically	offered	as	theories	of	
knowledge	itself,	rather	than	of	epistemic	coincidence	(e.g.,	Goldman	
1967).
Unfortunately,	causal	theories	of	knowledge	fail.	One	of	their	clear-
est	failings	stems	from	the	existence	of	causally	impotent,	mind-inde-
pendent	 truths	—	e.g.,	on	many	accounts,	 those	of	mathematics	 and	
ethics.12	 If	 causal	 connection	 to	 the	 truth	 is	 required	 for	 knowledge,	
and	causal	connection	to	some	truths	is	impossible,	then	knowledge	
of	those	truths	is	impossible.
10.	 This	 definition	 comes	 from	 Google’s	 in-engine	 dictionary.	 Other	 defini-
tions	 serve	 my	 rhetorical	 aims	 less	 well,	 but	 in	 no	 way	 threaten	 them.	 
Dictionary.com’s	definition	appeals	to	chance,	which	might	itself	be	accounted	
for	modally	or	explanatorily:	“a	striking	occurrence	of	two	or	more	events	at	
one	time	apparently	by	mere	chance”.	Merriam-Webster’s	definition	similarly	
appeals	to	accident,	though	it	also	—	tellingly,	I	think	—	appeals	to	connection:	
“the	occurrence	of	events	that	happen	at	the	same	time	by	accident	but	seem	
to	have	some	connection”.
11.	 One	might	doubt	that	the	time	causes	the	clock	to	read	“10:00”	in	the	good	
case,	but	surely	there	is	some	explanatory	connection	between	the	two,	caus-
al	or	otherwise.	(Consider	how	natural	it	is	to	say	that	a	working	clock	reads	
“10:00”	at	10:00	because	it	is	10:00.)	So,	at	worst,	this	ultimately	supports	ex-
planationism	over	causationism,	which	falls	nicely	in	line	with	my	aims.
12.	 The	mind-independence	 ensures	 that	 a	 causal	 connection	 cannot	 run	 the	
other	way:	our	beliefs	cannot	cause	the	truth.	Causal	inefficacy	and	mind-in-
dependence	are	contentious	in	both	metaethics	and	the	philosophy	of	math-
ematics,	but	 so	 long	as	we	have	—	or	even	 just	wish	 to	 theorize	about	 the	
possibility	 of	—	knowledge	 in	 some	domains	of	 causally	 inefficacious,	mind-
independent	truth,	the	problem	stands.
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modal	differences:	pure	mathematical	truths	are	necessary,	and	there-
fore	 all	 track	one	 another	perfectly	 across	modal	 space.15)	Helpfully,	
Marc	Lange	(2010)	develops	an	explanatory	account	of	coincidence,	
precisely	 to	capture	this	practice	of	distinguishing	mathematical	coin-
cidences	from	non-coincidences.	In	this	section,	I	adapt	his	account	to	
provide	a	sufficient	explanationist	condition	for	epistemic	coincidence.	
Begin	 with	 a	 mathematical	 coincidence	 contrast,	 using	 two	 of	
Lange’s	examples:
Calculator	 	 	 Using	 a	 standard	 calculator	 (or	 keyboard)	
1–9	number	pad,	one	can	create	palindromic	numbers	by	
moving	back	and	forth	across	rows	(e.g.,	789987),	up	and	
down	columns	(e.g.,	369963),	and	along	diagonals	(e.g.,	
159951).	There	are	16	such	numbers.	All	of	them	are	divis-
ible	by	37.	(Lange	2010,	308–9;	drawn	from	the	Decem-
ber	1986	issue	of	The Mathematical Gazette)
Diophantine			Here	are	two	Diophantine	equations	(ones	
where	the	variables	can	take	only	integer	values):	2x2(x2 – 
1)	=	3(y2	–	1)	and	x(x	–	1)/2	=	2n	–	1.	These	two	equations	
have	the	same	five	positive	solutions:	x	=	1,	2,	3,	6,	and	91.	
(Lange	2010,	309;	drawn	from	Guy	1988,	704)	
Diophantine	is	widely	regarded	as	a	coincidence.	Calculator	is	not,	
because	of	the	following	proof:
[L]et	a, a + d, a	+	2d	be	any	three	integers	 in	arithmetic	
progression.	Then	
a.105 + (a + d).104 + (a	+	2d).103 + (a	+	2d).102 + (a + d).10	+	
a.1	=	a(105	+	104	+	103	+	102	+	10	+	1)	+	d(104	+	2.103	+	2.102 
+	10)	=	1111111a	+	12210d	=	1221(91a	+	10d).	
15.	 Like	the	claim	of	causal	impotence,	the	necessity	claim	is	contentious	(in	me-
taethics	as	well	—	e.g.,	Rosen	forthcoming),	but	innocent	here	(compare	note	
12).
outstrip	 causal	differences,	 and	 thus	no	causationist	account	 can	ac-
commodate	all	of	our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence.
There	is	a	second,	related	problem	for	causationism.	In	addition	to	
coincidence	contrasts	where	there	are	no causal	connections,	there	are	
coincidence	contrasts	where	the	causal	connections	appear	to	be	the	
same. I	mentioned	one	example	earlier,	involving	Goldman’s	fake	barn	
case.	Here	is	a	somewhat	different	example:
Bad Sheep			Mary	sees	a	sheep-façade	in	a	field	and	judg-
es	there	to	be	a	sheep	in	the	field.	Unbeknownst	to	Mary,	
there	is	a	sheep	hiding	behind	the	sheep-façade,	which	is	
there	because	it	was	attracted	by	the	façade.	
Good Sheep			Bo	sees	a	sheep-façade	in	a	field	and	judges	
there	to	be	a	sheep	in	the	field.	She	does	so	because	she	
knows	 that	what	 she	 is	 seeing	 is	 either	 a	 sheep-façade	
or	the	one	local	sheep,	and	that	whenever	the	former	is	
present,	the	latter	is	hiding	behind	it.	
Intuitively,	Bad Sheep	 is	 a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence,	 while	
Good Sheep	is	not.	Yet	arguably	Mary’s	and	Bo’s	beliefs	bear	the	same	
causal	connection	to	the	truth.	The	apparent	existence	of	such	same-
cause	 contrasts	 seems	 to	 show	 yet	 again	 that	 differences	 in	 coinci-
dence-status	outstrip	causal	differences.	I	address	cases	like	these	in	
§7.	For	now,	I	focus	on	the	issues	raised	by	no-cause	contrasts.
3.  A Sufficient Condition for Epistemic Coincidence
The	existence	of	no-cause	contrasts	is	predictable	given	that	non-phi-
losophers	 distinguish	 coincidences	 from	 non-coincidences	 in	 other	
contexts	 involving	 causally	 inefficacious	 truths.	Mathematicians,	 for	
example,	describe	 some	 sets	of	mathematical	 truths	 as	 coincidental,	
others	as	non-coincidental.	Yet	there	are	no	differences	in	causal	rela-
tion	between	sets	of	pure	mathematical	truths.14	(There	are	likewise	no	
14.	 They	 are	 also	 not	 “concurrence[s]	 of	 events	 or	 circumstances”	—	another	
overly	narrow	aspect	of	the	dictionary	definition.
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Unified			E	is	a	unified	explanation	for	the	members	of	Γ	if	
and	only	if	no	isolable	part	of	E	explains	some	members	
of	Γ	at	least	as	well	as	E	but	fails	to	explain	other	members	
of	Γ	at	least	as	well	as	E.17
Unified	 accounts	 for	 the	 contrast	 between	 Calculator	 and	 Dio-
phantine.	We	can	prove	that	the	two	equations	in	Diophantine	have	
the	relevant	positive	solutions.	And	thus	we	can	prove	that	both do	by	
conjoining	those	proofs.	But	this	is	not	a	unified	explanation:	we	can	
prove	 that	one	of	 the	equations,	but	not	 the	other,	has	 the	 relevant	
positive	solutions	using	a	proper	subpart	of	that	joint	explanation.	By	
contrast,	the	proof	offered	for	Calculator	shows	that	all	numbers	with	
certain	properties	—	ones	shared	by	numbers	 formed	in	 the	relevant	
way	on	a	number	pad	—	will	be	divisible	by	37	(and	1221).	
Lange	takes	mathematical	coincidence	to	obtain	where	there	is	no	
unified	explanation	for	a	set	of	mathematical	truths.18	Can	the	preced-
ing	 be	 adapted	 as	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 coincidence	 generally?	
Consider	 the	 conditions	 under	which	 the	Minsk	 case	would	 either	
cease	 to	 seem	coincidental,	 or	 at	 least	 seem	 less	 coincidental,	 if	we	
think	of	coincidence	as	an	explanatory	phenomenon.	First,	our	being	
in	Minsk	at	the	same	time	would	seem	no	(or	less	of	a)	coincidence	if	
17.	 Lange	notes	some	complications	 that	we	can	safely	set	aside.	First,	unifica-
tion	“may	be	vague	at	the	margins	—	for	instance,	in	whether	a	given	proof	
explaining	one	 component	 can	be	 expanded	 to	 cover	 another	 component	
merely	 by	 removing	 an	 otiose	 restriction,	 or	 only	 by	 adding	 some	 slight	
further	 resource”	 (Lange	2010,	 322).	There,	he	 thinks,	 the	notion	of	 coinci-
dence	will	be	correspondingly	vague.	This	is	a	problem	only	if	our	intuitions	
about	epistemic	coincidence	are	never	vague	at	 the	margins,	a	claim	there	
is	some	evidence	against	(see	§7).	Second,	there	may	be	ways	of	developing	
disunified	proofs	so	that	their	elements	cannot	be	disentangled.	I	don’t	know	
whether	this	problem	can	impact	the	issues	we	are	talking	about	here,	but	it	
seems	clear	that	this	is	a	technical	issue,	not	a	substantive	one.	Third,	Lange	
ultimately	weakens	his	account	of	coincidence,	allowing	that	a	unified	expla-
nation	need	not	explain	all	members	of	Γ,	but	may	merely	explain	why	each	
is	true	if	any	are.	We	can	safely	accept	this	amendment.	
18.	 At	least	where	the	members	of	the	set	share	some	common	feature	that	calls	
out	for	unified	explanation.	It	is	not	necessarily	a	coincidence	that	2+2=4	and	
2	is	the	only	even	prime,	even	if	there	is	no	unified	explanation	for	these	facts.	
So	not	only	is	the	number	divisible	by	37,	but	by	1221	
(=	3	X	11	X	37).	(Nummela	1987,	147;	as	quoted	by	Lange	
2010,	310)
How	does	this	proof	show	that	Calculator	is	not	a	coincidence?	It	
is	not	merely	in	virtue	of	being a proof.	After	all,	we	can	prove	Diophan-
tine. Rather,	the	proof	shows	that	Calculator	is	not	a	coincidence	be-
cause	it	enables	us	to	provide	a	unified explanation	of	the	sixteen	results	
(i.e.,	of	the	fact	that	789987,	369963,	159951,	etc.	are	all	divisible	by	37).	
There	is	reportedly	nothing	like	this	for	Diophantine.
To	get	at	the	relevant	sense	of	unification,	note	that	for	any	appar-
ent	coincidence	between	the	members	of	a	set	Γ,	it	may	be	possible	to	
develop	a	joint explanation	by	conjoining	the	respective	explanantia	of	
each	member	of	Γ.16	For	example,	it	might	seem	quite	the	coincidence	
if	you	and	I	were	in	Minsk	at	the	same	time.	We	can	offer	the	explana-
tion:	you	are	spending	your	sabbatical	in	Minsk,	and	I	am	on	vacation	
in	Minsk.	Clearly,	this	does	nothing	to	eliminate	the	coincidence.
What	separates	such	merely	conjunctive	explanations	from	appro-
priately	unified	ones?	In	the	Minsk	example,	we	can	offer	just	as	good	
an	explanation	of	one explanandum,	but	not	the	other,	by	isolating	a	
portion	of	the	explanans	on	offer.	There	is	a	coincidence	between	your 
being in Minsk and	my being in Minsk. The	first	conjunct	in	the	proposed	
explanans	—	you	are	spending	your	sabbatical	in	Minsk	—	explains	the	
former	incident	just	as	well	as	the	total,	conjunctive	explanans	does,	
and	does	not	explain	the	latter	at	all.	This	motivates:
16.	 I	 say	 “may”	because	 it	 is	not	 clear	 that	 all	 such	 conjunctions	 constitute	ex-
planations.	Relatedly,	Lange	distinguishes	unified	explanations	from	unified	
deductions.	Consider,	 for	 example,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	decimal	expansion	of	 e 
begins	2.718281828.	The	chances	of	this	early	repetition	of	‘1828’	are	one	in	
several	thousand.	This	is	widely	regarded	as	a	coincidence	(Lange	2010,	324;	
drawn	from	Gowers	2007,	34).	The	fact	that	we	can	construct	a	unified	proof	
that	there	is	this	repetition	clearly	provides	no	explanation of	it.	How	to	under-
stand	such	mathematical	explanation	is	a	difficult	question	(one	Lange	tack-
les	elsewhere,	e.g.,	in	his	2016),	but,	for	our	purposes,	the	intuitive	distinction	
will	suffice.
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set	—	e.g.,	in	the	case	where	the	set	has	two	members,	neither	explains	
the	other.	Thus:
Coincidence		 	It	 is	a	coincidence	that	the	members	of	Γ 
are	all	 true	if	(a)	there	is	no	unified	explanation	for	the	
members	of	Γ	and	(b)	no	explanatory	chain	links	all	mem-
bers	of	Γ.
The	addition	of	(b)	is	well-motivated,	because	(b)	is	clearly	recom-
mended	by	 the	same	underlying	 thought	as	 (a).	They	 represent	 the	
two	ways	in	which	there	can	be	an	explanatory connection between	the	
members	of	a	set:	(a)	through	a	shared	relation	to	something	outside	
the	 set	or	 (b)	 through	 internal	 relations	within	 it.22	Coincidence	ob-
tains	where	 there	 is	no	 such	connection.	 In	 the	epistemic	 case,	 this	
gives	us:	
Explanationist	 	 	 For	any	 true	belief	B	and	 truth	 it	 con-
cerns	T,	 B	 is	 coincidentally true	 if	 (a)	 there	 is	 no	unified	
explanation	for	B	and	T;	(b)	T	does	not	explain	B;	and	(c)	
B	does	not	explain	T.23
22.	 Lange	anticipates	 this	development:	 “[S]uppose	 that	one	 component	 [of	 a	
potential	mathematical	 coincidence]	 is	 a	mathematical	 axiom.	 Perhaps	 an	
axiom	has	no	explanation.	But	the	fact	that	all	of	those	components	are	true	
is	not	then	obviously	coincidental	—	especially in a case where the axiom explains 
the other component’s truth.	…	[I]f	F	is	an	axiom	and	has	no	explanation,	where-
as	G	is	explained	by	F,	then	it	is	no	coincidence	that	F	and	G	both	hold	…”	
(Lange	2010,	n.	11,	emphasis	mine).	(In	this	same	note,	he	also	mentions	the	
possibility	that	axioms	explain	themselves,	allowing	for	unified	explanations	
of	sets	that	include	axioms.)
23.	 I	offer	this	definition	in	terms	of	a	single	belief,	rather	than	a	set	of	beliefs,	
merely	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.	Once	we	move	to	sets,	there	is	(for	one)	a	
question	about	how	many	of	the	beliefs	need	to	be	explanatorily	connected	
to	 their	attendant	 truths	 in	order	 to	avoid	epistemic	coincidence.	Since	Ex-
planationist is,	again,	merely	a	sufficient	condition,	I	could	sidestep	this	by	
noting	that	a	sufficient	condition	would	be	when	there	are	no	connections	
between	any	elements	of	the	sets.	But	this	seemed	needlessly	wordy,	and	the	
simplification	will	make	no	difference	in	what	follows.
your	presence	explained	mine,	or	vice	versa	—	say,	if	I	followed	you	to	
Minsk.	Second,	our	both	being	in	Minsk	would	seem	no	(or	less	of	a)	
coincidence	if	some	third	factor	explained	both	of	our	presences	—	say,	
if	we	were	both	attending	a	conference	being	held	in	Minsk	that	day.19
The	latter,	third-factor	explanation	is	a	unified	explanation.20	The	
former,	where	one	of	us	follows	the	other,	may	be	as	well.21	But	even	
if	not,	we	can	accommodate	all	relevant	possibilities	by	adding	a	well-
motivated	second	conjunct	to	our	sufficient	condition:	a	coincidence	
obtains	 if	 there	 is	no	unified	explanation	 for	all	elements	of	 the	set	
in	 question	 and no	 explanatory	 chain	 linking	 all	 elements	 of	 that	
19.	 As	Lange	argues,	coincidences	appear	to	be	gradable.	Certainly,	there	is	still	
some	coincidence	left	here:	perhaps	it	is	a	coincidence	that	we	both	attended	
this	conference.	But	it	should	be	clear	that	the	explanation	on	offer	makes	our	
meeting	less	of	a	coincidence.	I	will	not	address	here	how	coincidental	belief-
truth	correspondence	has	to	be	to	undermine	knowledge,	though	I	will	ges-
ture	in	what	I	take	to	be	the	right	direction	in	§7.	Nevertheless,	this	is	worth	
noting	because	it	heads	off	a	common	objection:	that	no physical	events	are	
coincidences	on	an	explanationist	account,	because	all	physical	events	have	
a	common	cause:	the	Big	Bang.	As	Lange	points	out,	this	more	plausibly	sug-
gests	that	which	explanatory	connections	serve	to	eliminate	coincidence	is	a	
contextual	matter;	it	does	not	threaten	the	claim	being	relied	on	here,	that	a	
total	absence	of	explanatory	connection	is	sufficient	for	coincidence.
20.	Again,	at	least	as	long	as	we	keep	in	mind	that	coincidence	is	gradable	(see	
previous	note).	For	example,	in	order	to	explain	why	we	are	both	in	Minsk,	
we	may	need	to	appeal	to	the	conference	as	well	as	psychological	facts	about	
each	of	us.	The	conference	is	a	unified	explanation	for	our	presences.	But	the	
full	explanation	that	includes	our	independent	intentions	to	attend	the	con-
ference	will	be	partially	disunified,	since	we	may	be	able	to	explain	your	pres-
ence	just	as	well	without	appealing	to	my	intention.	This	is	no	objection.	It	
simply	raises	the	question	of	whether	our	intentions	are	coincidental.	If	there	
is	some	unified	explanation	for	them	—	such	as	our	both	being	members	of	
an	association	 for	whose	members	 the	conference	 is	mandatory	—	perhaps	
they	are	not,	in	which	case	a	stronger	unified	explanation	for	our	presence	is	
available.	(Then,	of	course,	there	is	the	question	of	whether	our	membership	
is	coincidental….)
21.	 If	 I	 am	 there	because	of	 you,	 then	by	 the	 transitivity	of	 explanation,	what-
ever	 explains	 your	 presence	 explains	mine.	 But	 the	 view	 should	 not	 turn	
on	whether	 there	 is	such	 transitivity.	The	unified-explanation	account	also	
won’t	work	in	cases	where	at	least	one	element	of	the	apparent	coincidence	
is	a	 fundamental	 fact,	unless	fundamental	 facts	explain	themselves	—	again,	
something	the	view	should	not	turn	on.
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to	explain the reliability of	our	mathematical	beliefs.	He	begins	with	his	
titular	question:
What	 is	 the	 Benacerraf	 Problem?	 There	 does	 not	 seem	
to	be	a	 satisfying	answer.	There	does	not	 seem	 to	be	a	
sense	of	 “explain	 the	 reliability”	 in	which	 it	 is	plausible	
both	that	it	appears	in	principle	impossible	to	explain	the	
reliability	of	our	mathematical	beliefs	and	that	the	appar-
ent	in	principle	impossibility	of	explaining	their	reliability	
undermines	them.	The	problem	is	quite	general,	infecting	
[many]	 arguments	with	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 Benacerraf	
Problem	…	.	(Clarke-Doane	2016,	36)
He	ends	the	paper	shortly	thereafter:
[M]any	philosophers	would	hold	that	a	justified	true	be-
lief	which	 is	 both	 safe	 and	 sensitive	qualifies	 as	 knowl-
edge	…	.	Perhaps	the	present	discussion	helps	to	explain	
why.	“Gettiered”	beliefs	—	justified	and	true	beliefs	which	
fail	to	qualify	as	knowledge	—	are	plausibly	beliefs	whose	
truth	 is	 coincidental	 in	a	malignant	 sense.	What	 is	 that	
sense?	 It	 is	arguably	precisely	 the	sense	 in	which	 learn-
ing	 that	 the	 truth	of	one’s	beliefs	 is	 coincidental	would	
undermine	them.	If	this	is	correct,	then	there	is	a	“transla-
tion	scheme”	between	 the	claim	that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	
relevantly	 explain	 the	 reliability	 of	 our	 [beliefs],	 given	
their	truth,	and	the	claim	that	those	beliefs	are	Gettiered.	
(Clarke-Doane	2016,	36)
Obviously,	I	think	Clarke-Doane	is	right	that	Gettiered	beliefs	are	
those	“whose	truth	is	coincidental	in	a	malignant	sense”.	I	also	think	he	
is	right	that	there	is	a	“translation	scheme”	between	the	impossibility	
of	a	certain	kind	of	explanation	and	the	presence	of	epistemic	coinci-
dence,	and	that	this	is	the	worry	behind	the	Benacerraf	Problem.	But	
I	think	he	is	wrong	about	what	needs explaining.	He	takes	the	relevant	
explanandum	to	be	“the	reliability	of	our	[beliefs],	given	their	truth,”	
This	 is	 our	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 epistemic	 coincidence.	 The	 next	
question	 is	whether	 it	avoids	causationism’s	problem	with	no-cause	
contrasts.
4.  Explanationist and No-Cause Contrasts
Explanationist	can	accommodate	no-cause	contrasts	if,	in	all	relevant	
non-coincidental	cases,	there	are	no	causal	connections	but	there	are	
still	explanatory	ones.	For	instance,	while	there	may	be	no	causal	con-
nection	between	 the	 fact	 that	89	 is	prime	and	Lisa’s	belief	 in	Good 
Math,	there	must	be	some	explanatory	connection	—	one	absent	in	Bad 
Math.
Indeed,	 I	do	not	 think	 there	are	 any	non-coincidental	 cases	with-
out	explanatory	connections.	The	best	evidence	for	this,	I	contend,	is	
that	 in	 cases	where	 it	 is	unclear what	 the	 connection	 is,	we	 tend	 to	
raise	epistemological	worries	about	the	beliefs	in	question.	One	might	
naturally	be	puzzled,	for	example,	about	how	the	fact	that	89	is	prime	
is	connected	to	Lisa’s	belief.	If	we	begin	to	suspect	that	no	such	con-
nection	is	possible,	we	are	likely	to	wonder	whether	her	being	right	
is	a	coincidence	after	all,	or	even	whether	she	is	right	that	89	is	prime,	
since	we	may	well	have	arrived	at	this	conclusion	by	her	same	method.
This	line	of	thought	is	given	philosophical	treatment	within	several	
massive,	 overlapping	 literatures	 on	 a	 set	 of	 related	 epistemological	
challenges,	the	most	famous	of	which	is	the	Benacerraf	Problem	(or	
“Benacerraf-Field	Challenge”)	in	the	philosophy	of	mathematics	(Bena-
cerraf	1973;	Field	1989).	My	view	is	 that	 these	challenges	are	rooted	
in	concerns	about	epistemic	coincidence,	ones	motivated	most	easily,	
and	arguably	only, by	explanationism.	The	challenges’	framing	is	cer-
tainly	suggestive	—	there	 is	 frequent	 talk,	 for	 instance,	of	 “links”	and	
“connections”.	 What’s	 more,	 modalism	 renders	 these	 challenges	 in-
comprehensible	in	domains	of	purportedly	necessary	truth	like	math-
ematics	 and	 ethics,	 a	 claim	 argued	 for	—	strikingly,	 championed — by	
some	 modalists.	 Consider	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 last	 in	 a	 series	 of	
recent,	 influential	 papers	 by	 Justin	 Clarke-Doane	 (2012,	 2014,	 2015,	
2016),	wherein	he	understands	the	Benacerraf	Problem	as	a	challenge	
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test for	such	explanatory	connections.	If	we	want	to	know	whether	I	
followed	you	to	Minsk,	 it	 is	natural	to	ask	whether,	had	you	instead	
gone	 to	Helsinki,	 I’d	 be	 there,	 too.	 The	 answer	 is	 telling:	 if	 so,	 this	
looks	like	evidence	that	I’m	following	you	(or	that	there	is	some	other	
connection	between	us).	But	if	it	is	impossible for	you	to	have	gone	to	
Helsinki,	the	test	doesn’t	work;	even	if	we	accept	that	the	impossibil-
ity	of	the	antecedent	entails	"if	you	had	gone	to	Helsinki,	I	would	have	
followed	you	there",	we	learn	nothing	at	all	about	whether	I	followed	
you	to	Minsk.
Enoch	cites	three	ways	of	explaining	belief-truth	correlations:	the	
truth	might	explain	the	beliefs;	the	beliefs	might	explain	the	truth;	or	
some	 third	 factor	might	 explain	 both.24	 The	 affinities	with	 Explana-
tionist	are	beyond	striking;	these	are	precisely	the	ways	Explanation-
ist	offers	 for	 avoiding	 (or	 lessening)	 epistemic	 coincidence.25	These	
framings	retain	the	intuitive	force	of	the	Benacerraf	Problem	and	its	
relatives.	 And	 they	 vindicate	 our	 puzzlement	 about	Good Math:	 it	
seems like	no	coincidence	that	Lisa	gets	the	right	answer,	but	if	there	
could	 in	principle	be	no	explanatory	connection	between	her	belief	
and	the	fact	that	89	is	prime,	it	would	be	a	coincidence	after	all.	
I	submit	that	all	cases	involving	true	beliefs,	where	there	is	no	ex-
planatory	connection	between	those	beliefs	and	the	truth,	are	cases	of	
epistemic	coincidence.	I	can	think	of	no	counterexamples,	and	further	
submit	that	the	intuitive	force	of	the	Benacerraf	Problem	and	its	rela-
tives	rests	on	the	impossibility	of	such	counterexamples.
In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 argue	 that	 there	 are coincidence	 con-
trasts	 where	 all	 modal	 relations	 between	 beliefs	 and	 truth	 are	 the	
same	—	“same-modality	 contrasts”	—	and	 that	 modalism	 therefore	
cannot	 accommodate	 all	 judgements	 about	 epistemic	 coincidence.	
This	was	predicted,	first,	by	my	framing	of	modalism	as	a	misguided	
24.	 Enoch	goes	on	to	propose	a	solution	to	the	challenge	for	normative	realism.	
This	solution	fails,	as	argued	in	Elliott	and	Faraci	(m.s.),	because	the	explana-
tion	he	offers	is	not	unified.
25.	 And	this	isn’t	merely	an	artifact	of	my	authorship;	Explanationist	was	moti-
vated	as	an	adaptation	of	Lange’s	wholly	independent	work	on	mathematical	
coincidence!
where	reliability	is	understood	modally.	But	it	is	clear	that	proponents	
of	the	Benacerraf	Problem	take	the	relevant	explanandum	to	be	some-
thing	 actual, not	 something	modal	 given	 something	 actual.	 Here	 is	
Field:
[T]he	phenomenon	that	our	beliefs	about	(say)	electrons	
are	reliable	is	not	simply	that	our	“electron”	beliefs	coun-
terfactually	depend	on	the	facts	about	electrons:	it	is	that	
our	beliefs	depend	on	the	facts	about	electrons	in such a 
way that	the	correlation	of	our	believing	the	sentence	‘p’	
and	its	being	the	case	that	p	would	be	maintained	given	
a	 variation	 in	 the	 facts	 about	 electrons.	 It	 is	 this type of 
counterfactual	 dependence	 that	 needs	 explaining,	 not	
counterfactual	dependence	by	itself.	But	now,	if	the	intel-
ligibility	of	 talk	of	 “varying	the	 facts”	 is	challenged	…	it	
can	easily	be	dropped	without	much	loss	to	the	problem:	
there	is	still	the	problem	of	explaining	the	actual	correla-
tion	between	our	believing	‘p’	and	its	being	the	case	that	
p.	(Field	1989,	238,	underlining	mine)
What	kinds	of	explanation	would	do	the	trick?	Here	is	David	Enoch,	
discussing	Field:
There	 is	 …	 a	 striking	 correlation	 between	 mathemati-
cians’	mathematical	beliefs	(at	least	up	to	a	certain	level	
of	complexity)	and	the	mathematical	truths.	Such	a	strik-
ing	correlation	calls	for	explanation.	…	Platonists	cannot	
explain	[it]	in	any	of	the	standard	ways	of	explaining	such	
a	correlation	—	by	invoking	a	causal	(or	constitutive)	con-
nection	 from	 the	first	 factor	 to	 the	 second,	 or	 from	 the	
second	 to	 the	 first,	 or	 from	 some	 third	 factor	 to	 both.	
(Enoch	2011,	158–9)
Field	claims	that	we	need	to	explain	the	actual correlation	between	
our	beliefs	and	the	truth.	He	also	offers	an	implicit	explanation	for	mo-
dalism’s	appeal:	modal	conditions	provide	an	intuitive	and	powerful	
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knowledge	of	non-contingent	matters,	because	 it	 is	 too	
easily	trivialised.	For	if	it	is	a	necessary	truth	that	so-and-
so,	then	believing	that	so-and-so	is	an	infallible	method	
of	being	right.	If	what	I	believe	is	a	necessary	truth,	then	
there	is	no	possibility	of	being	wrong.	That	is	so	whatever	
the	subject	matter	of	 the	necessary	truth	and	no	matter	
how	it	came	to	be	believed.	(Lewis	1986,	114–5,	underlin-
ing	mine)
We	 can	 reinforce	 Lewis’	 rejection	 of	 such	 “trivial	 infallibility”	 by	
considering	 the	 similarities	 between	 sensitivity	 and	 simple	 counter-
factual	models	of	causation.	For	example:
[W]e	may	define	a	cause	to	be	an object, followed by another 
… where, if the first object had not been, the second never had 
existed.	(Hume	1748,	sec.	VII)
Imagine	a	simple	causationist	view	on	which	any	 causal	connection	
rules	out	coincidence	and	causation	is	understood	as	above:	the	truth	
causes	our	beliefs,	precluding	epistemic	coincidence,	just	so	long	as	it	
is	the	case	that,	if	the	truth	“had not been”,	the	belief	“never had existed”.	It	
follows	that	necessary	truths	cause	all	of	our	beliefs,	and	therefore	can-
not	be	coincidental	with	them.	This	is	doubly	mistaken.	It	 is	implau-
sible	that	necessary	truths	cause	all	of	our	beliefs.	More	importantly	
for	our	purposes,	this	view	is	undermined	by	the	existence	of	no-cause	
contrasts	like	that	between	Bad Math	and	Good Math.	This	is	just	to	
reiterate	the	first	problem	for	causationism	raised	in	§2.	The	parallels	
with	sensitivity	are	obvious.	
Modalists	who	share	these	concerns	about	sensitivity	will	be	quick	
to	remind	us	of	a	major	development:	modal	conditions	that	attend	to	
variations	in	both	the	truth	and our	beliefs,	rather	than	just	the	former.	
The	most	popular	such	condition	is	safety:	beliefs	are	safe	just	in	case	
they	are	true	and	could	not	easily	have	been	false.	
Safety	improves	on	sensitivity	by	allowing	us	to	consider	whether	
our	beliefs	 in	necessary	truths	could	easily	have	diverged	 from	those	
cleanup	 of	 causationism	 and,	 second,	 by	 Clarke-Doane.	 The	 argu-
ments	to	come	follow	these	predictions.
5.  Same-Modality Contrasts and the Failure of Modalism
5.1 The Lewis and Clarke-Doane Expedition26
Clarke-Doane’s	argument	begins	with	sensitivity.	Beliefs	are	sensitive	
just	in	case	they	are	true	and,	had	the	relevant	truths	been	different,	
those	 beliefs	would	 have	 been	 correspondingly	 different.	His	 point	
about	sensitivity	is	widely	recognized:	beliefs	in	necessary	truths	“are	
vacuously	sensitive	on	a	standard	semantics”,	because	counterfactuals	
with	necessarily	false	antecedents	are	necessarily	true	(Clarke-Doane	
2016,	26).	This	point	is	most	famously	made	by	David	Lewis,	who	rais-
es	it	as	a	problem	for	applying	modal	conditions	to	beliefs	in	necessary	
truths.	 Ironically,	however,	Lewis	 is	often	quoted	out	of	context,	giv-
ing	the	false	impression	that	he,	like	Clarke-Doane,	takes	this	point	to	
undercut	the	force	of	the	Benacerraf	Problem.27	Here	is	the	oft-quoted	
passage,	except	the	underlined	portion	is	frequently	left	out:28 
Probably	 the	 right	 thing	 to	 say	 is	 that	 the	 demand	 for	
an	infallible	method	does	not	make	very	good	sense	for	
26.	As	will	become	clear,	this	is	something	of	a	misnomer;	but	I	couldn’t	resist.
27.	 The	explanation	may	be	that	this	passage	does	come	from	a	section	in	which	
Lewis	challenges	the	Benacerraf	Problem,	and	some	of	the	reasons	he	gives	
for	doing	so	do	concern	the	necessity	of	mathematical	and	modal	truth.	As	I	
read	Lewis,	his	central	reason	for	rejecting	it	is	that	“[o]ur	knowledge	of	math-
ematics	is	ever	so	much	more	secure	than	our	knowledge	of	the	epistemology	
that	seeks	to	cast	doubt	on	mathematics”	(Lewis	1986,	109).	Lewis	bolsters	
this	by	suggesting	that	we	should	have	different	standards	for	knowledge	of	
contingent	and	necessary	truths,	anyway,	though	he	ultimately	acknowledg-
es	that	we	should	hope	for	an	overarching	theory	that	encompasses	knowl-
edge	of	both	the	contingent	and	the	necessary.	Perhaps	explanationism	will	
point	the	way!
28.	Clarke-Doane	(2016,	26)	does	this,	but	let	me	not	pick	on	him.	The	same	trun-
cated	passage	appears	in	several	other	papers,	including	ones	that	are	critical 
of	trivial	sensitivity,	such	as	Schechter	(2010,	443).	I	find	this	particularly	sur-
prising	given	that	many,	I’d	think,	wouldn’t	want	to	give	up	a	chance	to	show	
that	Lewis	is	on	their	side!
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conditions	like	sensitivity	that	attend	only	to	variations	in	the	truth	fail	
to	account	for	coincidences	involving	necessary	truths.	In	exactly	the	
same	way,	modal	conditions	that	attend	to	variations	in	both	the	truth	
and our beliefs	fail	to	account	for	coincidences	involving	necessarily held 
beliefs in necessary truths.
As	we’ll	see	in	the	next	section,	this	final	point	allows	for	develop-
ment	of	same-modality	contrasts:	pairs	of	cases	—	one	intuitively	coin-
cidental,	the	other	non-coincidental	—	that	differ	in	coincidence-status	
but	not	in	the	modal	relations	between	the	beliefs	and	truth.	The	exis-
tence	of	such	contrasts	demonstrates	that	differences	in	coincidence-
status	 outstrip	 modal	 differences.	 It	 follows	 that	 modalism	 cannot	
accommodate	 all	 judgements	 about	 epistemic	 coincidence	—	as	 pre-
dicted,	for	much	the	same	reasons	of	narrowness	as	causationism.
5.2 A Same-Modality Contrast
In	this	section,	I	construct	a	same-modality	contrast.	I	do	so	slowly,	to	
avoid	worries	 that	 the	ultimate	 failure	 is	about	 truth	or	 justification,	
rather	than	coincidence.	Begin	with:
TB			Eula	consults	the	Source	to	form	some	beliefs	about	
which	numbers	are	prime.	All	of	Eula’s	resultant	beliefs	
are	true.
This	may	or	may	not	be	a	case	of	epistemic	coincidence.
Next,	we	need	to	make	Eula	defeasibly	justified	in	consulting	the	
Source.	 But	 there	 also	 need	 to	 be	 no	 defeaters for	 her	 justification.	
There	must	be	no	available	evidence	that	her	beliefs	are	false	—	i.e.,	no	
rebutting	defeaters.	There	must	also	be	no	available	evidence	that	the	
Source	is	not	a	legitimate	source	of	information	—	i.e.,	no	undercutting 
defeaters.	All	of	this	can	simply	be	stipulated,	but	the	issue	of	under-
cutting	defeat	raises	an	issue	worth	addressing.
Since	Eula’s	beliefs	are	true,	it	is	easy	to	accept	that	there	is	little	to	
no	evidence	that	they	are	false.	However,	if	the	evidence	always	points	
suspicion	is	that	he	is	banking	on	an	alternative	account	of	such	dependence	
that	would	capture	explanatory	connections.
truths.	 This	 brings	 us	 to	 what	 is	 arguably	 Clarke-Doane’s	most	 sig-
nificant	insight:	the	safety	of	our	beliefs	in	necessary	truths	is	a	direct	
function	of	the	modal stability of	those	beliefs	—	how	nearby	the	worlds	
are	in	which	they	are	different. So	long	as	our	belief-forming	method	
would	give	the	same	results	at	nearby	worlds,	our	beliefs	are	safe.	
Ironically,	help	may	come	from	the	challengers	here.	Clarke-Doane,	
like	Enoch	and	others,	interprets	evolutionary	debunking	arguments	
in	metaethics	 (e.g.,	Street	2006)	as	 close	 relatives	of	 the	Benacerraf	
Problem.	 These	 arguments	 begin	with	 the	 premise	 that	 there	 is	 an	
evolutionary	 explanation	 for	 our	 ethical	 beliefs.	 Assuming	 there	 is	
no	reason	to	believe	that	evolution	tracks	the	ethical	truth,	it	seems	it	
would	be	a	“cosmic	coincidence”29	if	our	beliefs	corresponded	to	that	
truth.	But,	Clarke-Doane	argues,	 the	robustness	of	 this	evolutionary	
explanation	may	well	 ensure	 that	 our	 ethical	 beliefs	 couldn’t	 easily	
have	been	different,	and	thus	that	they	are	safe.
Modalists	unfriendly	 to	Clarke-Doane’s	 conclusion	may	 try	 to	 re-
sist	by	developing	an	account	of	proximity	allowing	for	nearby	worlds	
where	 our	 beliefs	 are	 different,	 either	 because	 evolutionary	 forces	
produce	different	beliefs,	or	because	our	beliefs	are	not	explained	by	
evolutionary	forces	(e.g.,	Warren	and	Waxman	m.s.).30	Unfortunately,	
this	 strategy	 cannot	 avoid	modalism’s	 fundamental	 problem.	Modal	
29.	 I	borrow	this	phrase	from	Matt	Bedke	(2009),	though	others	have	put	things	
similarly;	e.g.,	William	Kneale	(1950,	123)	talks	of	“historical	accidents	on	the	
cosmic	scale”	(though	in	a	slightly	different	context).
30.	Or	they	may	challenge	Clarke-Doane’s	claim	that	it	is	legitimate	to	assume	
the	truth	of	our	beliefs	here.	There	is	much	debate	over	the	circumstances	
under	which	one	may	assume	the	truth	of	our	beliefs	in	addressing	the	Bena-
cerraf	Problem	(e.g.,	Christensen	2011;	Kelly	2013;	Locke	2014;	Morton	forth-
coming;	Vavova	2014,	2018).	But	denying	this	assumption	doesn’t	avoid	the	
fundamental	problem:	our	actual	beliefs	could be	true,	and	therefore	both	safe	
and	sensitive,	and	yet	there	might	remain	epistemic	coincidence.	I	do	think,	
however,	that	there	are	affinities	between	explanationism	and	views	about	
the	 conditions	 under	which	 assuming	 the	 truth	 of	 our	 beliefs	 is	 question-
begging.	Justin	Morton	(forthcoming),	for	example,	argues	that	assuming	the	
truth	 is	question-begging	when,	given	that	assumption,	 “our	beliefs	within	
the	relevant	domain	are	probabilistically	independent	of	their	truth”.	But	he	
also	raises	concerns	about	modalism	that	would	seem	to	undermine	his	own	
proposal	 if	 ‘probabilistic	dependence’	were	 interpreted	modally.	My	strong	
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about	which	numbers	 are	 prime.	All	 of	 Eula’s	 resultant	
beliefs	are	true,	and	there	is	no	available	evidence	to	the	
contrary.
You	might	worry	that	without	more	information	about	the	Source,	
you	shouldn’t	accept	that	Eula	is	justified	in	using	it.	But	we	could	just	
stipulate,	say,	that	the	Source	was	recommended	to	Eula	by	a	typically	
trustworthy	 friend,	or	even	 that	 the	Source	has	given	Eula	 indepen-
dently	 verified	 information	 in	 the	 past.	With	 or	without	 such	 stipu-
lations,	 it	remains	 indeterminate	whether	JTB	 is	a	case	of	epistemic	
coincidence.	
The	 next	 step	 is	 to	 develop	 the	 case	 so	 that	 Eula	meets	 any	 po-
tentially	relevant	modal	condition.	I’ve	already	explained	how	we	can	
do	 this:	we	 just	need	 to	 stipulate	 that	 the	 relevant	 truths	are	neces-
sary	—	I’m	 assuming	 which	 numbers	 are	 prime	 qualifies	—	and	 that	
Eula	necessarily	believes	what	she	believes.34	This	brings	us	to:
J□TB			Eula	is	defeasibly	justified	in	forming	beliefs	about	
which	numbers	are	prime	by	consulting	the	Source,	and	
there	is	no	available	evidence	that	the	Source	is	untrust-
worthy.	 Eula	 consults	 the	 Source	 to	 form	 some	 beliefs	
about	which	numbers	 are	 prime.	All	 of	 Eula’s	 resultant	
beliefs	 are	 true,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 available	 evidence	 to	
the	contrary.	At	every	possible	world,	Eula’s	counterpart	
forms	beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime	by	consult-
ing	the	Source’s	counterpart,	and	the	Source’s	counterpart	
delivers	the	same	answers	as	at	the	actual	world.35
34.	Of	course,	she	might	fail	to	meet	a	modal	condition	that	requires	her	not	to	
track	 the	 truth	 at	 certain	 worlds.	 But	 this	 suggests,	 implausibly,	 that	 Eula	
might	lack	knowledge	because	she	tracks	the	truth	too well.
35.	 You	might	think	that	it	is	not	even	in principle	possible	for	an	agent	to	neces-
sarily	believe	something.	If	so,	allow	me	to	press	you	as	follows.	First	ques-
tion:	How	modally	stable	can	a	belief	in	a	necessary	truth	be	(without	a	con-
nection	between	them)?	Second	question:	How	close	does	a	world	need	to	
be	 for	 it	 to	be	epistemologically	 relevant	 that	 you	 fail	 to	 track	 the	 truth	at	
that	world?	If	your	answers	to	these	questions	are	such	that	someone	could	
believe	a	necessary	truth	with	sufficient	modal	stability	that	they	could	only	
to	the	truth,	then	if	there	are	defeaters,	there	will	be	evidence	of	de-
featers.	I	will	be	assuming	that	the	first	antecedent	is	false	—	that	there	
can	be	misleading	evidence.31	But	little	hangs	on	this.	If	you	hold	that	
evidence	of	epistemic	coincidence	is	an	undercutting	defeater	(which	
I	 am	 inclined	 to	 accept32),	 but	 also	 that	 if	 there	 is	 epistemic	 coinci-
dence,	then	there	will	always	be	such	a	defeater	available	(which	I	am	
inclined	to	deny),	then	our	interest	here	is	in	beliefs	for	whom	the	only 
potential	defeater	is	evidence	of	epistemic	coincidence.33	I	include	the	
relevant	addendum	in	brackets	in:
JTB			Eula	is	defeasibly	justified	in	forming	beliefs	about	
which	numbers	are	prime	by	consulting	the	Source,	and	
there	is	no	available	evidence	that	the	Source	is	untrust-
worthy	 [except	 possibly	 for	 evidence	 of	 epistemic	 coin-
cidence].	Eula	consults	 the	Source	to	form	some	beliefs	
31.	 Or,	at	 least,	misleading	evidence	available to the agent,	 and	 thus	 relevant	 to	
whether	the	agent	is	justified.	One	can,	of	course,	insist	that	even	unavailable	
evidence	is	relevant	to	whether	the	agent	is	justified,	but	this	makes	it	diffi-
cult	to	distinguish	justification	from	coincidence.	On	such	a	view,	for	instance,	
Bertie	would	presumably	be	unjustified	in	Bad Clock.	In	any	case,	it	should	
be	clear	that	nothing	substantive	hangs	on	this.
32.	 Because	 this	paper	 is	already	quite	 long,	 I	won’t	say	much	about	 this	here,	
but	I	think	it	is	a	crucial	part	of	the	dialectic.	I	have	the	sense	that	many	epis-
temologists	are	becoming	dubious	about	 the	 importance	of	epistemic	coin-
cidence,	roughly	following	the	thought	that	if	one	reasons	well	and	arrives	
at	the	truth,	saying	that	this	somehow	doesn’t	rise	to	the	level	of	Knowledge	
seems	a	bit	precious.	But	while	I	have	been	framing	things	in	terms	of	Get-
tier	cases	to	avoid	confusion	with	other	elements	of	justification,	I	think	that	
ultimately	epistemic	coincidence	is	most	significant	as	a	defeater	for	justifi-
cation,	rather	than	for	knowledge	(as	per	Field,	rather	than	Benacerraf).	If	I	
have	good	evidence	that	there	cannot	possibly	be	an	explanatory	connection	
between	my	beliefs	and	the	truths	I	took	them	to	be	about,	that	is	excellent	
reason	to	doubt	the	reasonableness	of	forming	beliefs	in	the	relevant	domain,	
at	least	in	the	ways	I	have	been.	Crucially,	this	is	meant	to	be	compatible	with	
the	idea	that	it	 is	permissible	to	assume	the	truth	of	our	beliefs	in	account-
ing	 for	 their	connection	to	 the	truth	(see	note	30).	 Indeed,	explanationism	
helps	vindicate	this	thought:	one	cannot	expose	an	explanatory	connection	
between	the	members	of	a	set	without	assuming	those	members	exist!
33.	 As	well	as,	of	course,	everything	that	entails.	If	evidence	is	never	ultimately	
misleading,	then	there	will	also	be	evidence	that	some	such	defeater	exists,	
etc.
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the	contrary.	At	every	possible	world,	Eula’s	counterpart	
forms	beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime	by	consult-
ing	the	Source’s	counterpart,	and	at	every	possible	world,	
the	Source’s	counterpart	delivers	the	same	answers	as	at	
the	 actual	 world.	 [There	 is	 no	 explanatory	 connection	
between	 this	modal	 stability	 and	 the	 facts	 about	which	
numbers	are	prime.]
And	we	can	contrast	this	with	a	variation	on	Good Math:
Good Necessity	 	 	Lisa	 is	defeasibly	 justified	 in	 forming	
beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime	by	consulting	the	
Source.	“The	Source”	is	what	Lisa	calls	dividing	numbers	
by	their	possible	factors	and	believing	they	are	prime	if	
and	 only	 if	 she	 determines	 that	 they	 have	 exactly	 two	
factors:	1	and	themselves.	There	is	no	available	evidence	
that	 this	 is	 an	untrustworthy	method.	Lisa	 consults	 the	
Source	 to	 form	beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime.	
All	 of	 Lisa’s	 resultant	 beliefs	 are	 true;	 and	 there	 is	 no	
good	evidence	 to	 the	 contrary.	At	 every	possible	world,	
Lisa’s	counterpart	forms	beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	
prime	by	 consulting	 the	 Source,	 and	 the	 Source’s	 coun-
terpart	delivers	the	same	answers	as	at	the	actual	world.
It	seems	to	me,	and	I	hope	to	you,	that	Bad Necessity	is	a	case	of	
epistemic	coincidence,	while	Good Necessity	 is	not.	Of	course,	one	
could	claim	 that	 this	 is	not	 really	a	matter	of	epistemic	coincidence.	
Certainly,	it	seems	that	Eula	lacks	knowledge in	Bad Necessity,	but	per-
haps	this	is	due	to	some	other	aspect	of	the	final	condition	on	knowl-
edge,	or	perhaps	I	failed	to	show	that	the	knowledge-failure	here	isn’t	
primarily	 about	 justification	or	 truth.	But	note	 that	 the	adjustments	
made	to	get	from	J□TB	to	Bad Necessity	were	motivated	entirely	by	
Explanationist,	an	independently	motivated,	sufficient	condition	for	
epistemic	coincidence.	Denying	that	this	is	about	coincidence	seems	
unpromising.
In	 J□TB,	 Eula’s	 beliefs	 are	 justified	 and	 true,	 and	 they	 track	 the	
truth	across	modal	space.	Hopefully	you	already	share	my	view	that	
it	remains	an	open	question	whether	this	is	a	case	of	epistemic	coinci-
dence.	Either	way,	please	consider	the	following.
Our	final	 step	 is	 to	 add	details	 to	 contrast	 coincidental	 and	non-
coincidental	versions	of	J□TB.	According	to	Explanationist,	we	can	
generate	coincidence	by	eliminating	any	potentially	relevant	explana-
tory	connections;	I’ll	do	this	by	stipulating	that	the	Source	is	output-
ting	numbers	at	random.	
One	might	think	it	also	matters	whether	the	modal	stability	of	Eula’s	
beliefs	bears	an	explanatory	connection	to	the	truth.	My	view	is	that	
this	 alone	makes	no	difference.	A	 knowledge-loving	demon	 cannot	
eliminate	epistemic	coincidence	by	modally	stabilizing	Eula’s	beliefs	
about	which	numbers	are	prime	only	when	they	are	true	—	much	as,	in	
Bad Sheep,	a	sheep-façade	cannot	eliminate	epistemic	coincidence	by	
attracting	real	sheep	whenever	Mary	is	around.36	Again,	we	can	harm-
lessly	alleviate	such	worries	with	a	bracketed	addendum.	Here,	then,	
is	our	case	of	epistemic	coincidence:
Bad Necessity			Eula	is	defeasibly	justified	in	forming	be-
liefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime	by	consulting	 the	
Source,	and	there	is	no	available	evidence	that	the	Source	
is	untrustworthy.	In	fact,	the	Source	is	outputting	numbers	
at	random.	Eula	consults	the	Source	to	form	beliefs	about	
which	numbers	are	prime.	The	numbers	the	Source	out-
puts	at	random	are	all	prime	numbers.	Eula’s	resultant	be-
liefs	are	therefore	true;	and	there	is	no	good	evidence	to	
fail	to	believe	it	at	worlds	too	far	to	be	epistemologically	relevant,	then	my	
argument	goes	 through.	 If	not,	 then	perhaps	your	preferred	version	of	mo-
dalism	can	avoid	the	objection	raised	in	this	section,	though	it	would	still	be	
susceptible	to	related	objections	to	counterfactualism	raised	below.
36.	Of	course,	if	Eula	knew	that	the	demon	was	doing	this,	she	could	infer	from	
the	modal	stability	of	her	beliefs	 to	 their	actual	 truth,	but	 then	 that	would	
be	among	her	sources	of	information,	in	addition	to	the	Source.	This	would	
make	her	like	Bo	in	Good Sheep,	as	opposed	to	Mary	in	Bad Sheep.	More	on	
this	in	§7.
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Necessity	should	seem	coincidental	for	precisely	the	same	reason;	the	
rest	is	window-dressing.
The	above	speaks	against	modalism,	but	does	not	yet	undermine	it	
entirely.	What	it	entails	is	that	epistemic	coincidence	cannot	be	under-
stood	in	terms	of	a	modal	condition	on arbitrarily defined sets of beliefs. 
The	possibility	remains	that	we	can	salvage	modalism	by	picking	out	
sets	of	beliefs	in	some	particular	way	—	say,	by	examining	the	modal	
status	of	beliefs	in a domain or	formed using a certain method.38 
It	should	be	clear,	however,	that	my	case-based	argument	can	be	
extended	to	undermine	nearly	all	such	versions	of	modalism.	Nothing	
prevents	me,	for	instance,	from	changing	the	case	so	that	the	Source	
outputs	answers	to	all	of	Eula’s	mathematical	questions	at	random.39 
The	only	ways	out,	so	far	as	I	can	see,	would	be	to	define	the	set	so	as	
to	rule	out	the	truths’	being	necessary	and/or	the	beliefs’	being	nec-
essarily	held.	But	unless	there	is	some	independent	reason	for	think-
ing	such	a	restriction	would	apply	to	all	relevant	sets	of	beliefs,	 this	
amounts	to	capitulation.	Such	modalists	would	at	best	be	disjunctive 
modalists,	allowing	that	something	non-modal	(perhaps	an	absence	
of	explanatory	connection!)	is	doing	the	work	in	cases	involving	nec-
essarily	held	beliefs/beliefs	in	necessary	truths.	
Unfortunately,	such	disjunctive	modalism	is	theoretically	unstable.	
‘Epistemic	 coincidence’	 is	not	merely	 equivocal	between	modal	 and	
explanatory	conceptions;	it	is	not	like	river	‘bank’	and	financial	‘bank’.	
A	successful	account	—	disjunctive	or	otherwise	—	must	accommodate,	
if	 not	 explain,	 this	 deeper	 relation;	 the	 view	 cannot	 be	 that	 contin-
gent	coincidences	are	modal	phenomena,	necessary	coincidences	are	
38.	One	could	instead	try	to	salvage	modalism	by	appealing	to	modal	variation	
in	 something	 other	 than	 beliefs	 and	 truth,	 but	 it	 is	 very	 hard	 to	 see	what	
this	would	be,	and	why	my	case-based	strategy	couldn’t	be	extended	to	un-
dermine	it.	(I	am	also	taking	the	most	obvious	candidates,	things	like	belief-
forming	methods	or	bases	for	belief,	to	fall	within	the	bounds	of	the	sugges-
tion	in	the	main	text:	the	modal	variation	would	be	in	beliefs	formed	by	the	
relevant	method	or	on	the	relevant	basis.)
39.	Of	course,	the	larger	the	domain,	the	less	likely	it	will	seem	that	the	Source	
could	 consistently	 get	 things	 right	 by	 chance.	 But	 that	 is	 neither	 here	nor	
there;	the	point	is	that	if	it	did,	Eula’s	beliefs	would	be	coincidentally	true.
Here	is	a	related	worry	I	suspect	some	readers	will	have:	Bad Ne-
cessity	 and	Good Necessity	might	 seem	 too	 schematic,	 convoluted,	
bizarre,	 or	 precious	 for	 readers	 to	 have	 any	 (probative)	 intuitions	
about	them.	My	reply	is	that	most	of	what	goes	on	in	these	cases	is	
irrelevant	to	our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence.	The	stipu-
lations	about	 justification	 serve	merely	 to	 stave	off	worries	 that	 the	
contrast	is	a	justificatory	one.	And	if	Explanationist	is	true,	the	stipu-
lations	of	modal	stability	are	irrelevant	(at	least	in	the	bad	case).
Following	these	claims,	I	submit	that	the	move	from	Good Math	to	
Good Necessity	has	no	effect	on	our	judgements	about	epistemic	co-
incidence:	more	is	stipulated	about	Lisa’s	justification,	but	justification	
is	a	separate	issue;	and	the	increased	modal	stability	of	her	judgement	
doesn’t	make	 us	 any	more	 inclined	 to	 judge	 her	 beliefs	 non-coinci-
dentally	true.37	Lisa’s	beliefs	seem	non-coincidentally	true	because	she	
forms	them	in	a	way	that	seems	to	get at the	truth	and	which,	as	dis-
cussed	in	§4,	must	therefore	bear	some	explanatory	connection	to	it.
Similarly,	suppose	we	remove	the	relevant	stipulations	 from	Bad 
Necessity:	
Simply Bad			Eula	consults	the	Source	to	form	some	be-
liefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime.	The	Source	is	out-
putting	numbers	at	random.	These	numbers	are	all	prime.	
Eula’s	resultant	beliefs	are	therefore	true.	
It	seems	to	me,	and	I	hope	to	you,	that	Simply Bad	is	a	case	of	epis-
temic	coincidence.	Eula	may	or	may	not	be	justified	in	forming	her	be-
liefs	as	she	does,	but	again	this	is	a	separate	issue.	And	it	is	completely	
irrelevant	how	modally	 stable	her	beliefs	are.	There	 is	epistemic	co-
incidence	here	because	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	randomly	out-
put	numbers	bear	no	connection	to	 the	 truth	about	which	numbers	
are	prime,	and	thus	can	never	be	more	than	coincidentally	true.	Bad 
37.	 One	might	 claim	 that	 the	modal	 stability	 of	 her	 using	 the	method	 is	 best	
explained	by	 its	being	 connected	 to	 the	 truth.	That	poses	no	 threat	 to	my	
position;	 it	 is	squarely	 in	 line	with	 the	 idea	 that	modal	conditions	provide	
evidence	of	explanatory	connections.
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contrasts.	This	 is	because	if	all	explanatory	connections	can	be	mod-
eled	counterfactually,	then	both	explanationists	and	counterfactualists	
should	expect	that	some	set	of	counterfactual	conditions	can	accom-
modate	all	of	our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence.	The	issue	
here	will	be	the	comparative	strengths	of	these	views’	framings	of	the	
intuitive	roots	of	our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence.	
6.1 Against Counterfactualism 
Begin	by	contrasting	our	original	case	of	Bad Clock	with:
Okay Clock			Russ	wants	to	know	what	time	it	is.	He	con-
sults	his	kitchen	clock,	which	he	has	been	using	for	years,	
and	which	has	 typically	been	accurate.	The	 clock	 reads	
“10:00”	 because	 it	 is	 10:00.	 However,	 the	 clock	 breaks	
thirty	seconds	after	Russ	consults	it,	just	before	10:01.
Intuitively,	Okay Clock	 is	 not	 a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence.40 
Suppose	we	try	to	capture	this	using	sensitivity.	This	requires	us	to	lo-
cate	the	closest	world	where	the	truth	is	different.	Arguably,	the	small-
est	relevant	difference	would	be	a	change	of	one	minute,	 leaving	us	
with	a	tie	between	worlds	where	Russ	looks	at	his	clock	at	9:59	and	
10:01.41	The	former	gives	us	the	right	results;	the	latter	does	not,	since	
by	10:01	Russ’	 clock	 is	broken	and	he	would	 falsely	believe	 it	 to	be	
10:00.	
What	 could	motivate	 focusing	on	 the	9:59-world	 rather	 than	 the	
10:01-world?	Counterfactualists	must	claim	 that	 the	 former	 is	closer.	
But	on	what	grounds?	They	could	argue	that	the	9:59-world	is	closer	
simply	because	 the	 10:01-world	has	 the	additional	difference	of	 the	
clock’s	being	broken.	But	we	can	easily	suppose	that	some	much	larger 
40.	Perhaps	some	will	be	tempted	to	deny	this,	but	I	am	confident	I	could	build	
the	case	up	in	various	more	complicated	ways	to	make	the	points	to	come.	I	
also	make	similar	points	regarding	cases	introduced	by	others	in	§7.
41.	 This	 follows	 the	 standard	 idea	 that	 world-proximity	 is	 a	 function	 of	
world-similarity.
explanatory	phenomena,	and that’s an end to the matter. I	can	think	of	no	
plausible	modalist	account	of	this	relation.
For	 the	 simple	 causationist	 introduced	 above,	where	 there	 is	 no	
causation,	 there	are	no	coincidences.	 For	modalists,	 “where	 there	 is	
no	contingency,	there	are	no	coincidences”	(Wielenberg	2010,	461,	em-
phasis	mine).	 The	 former	 is	 a	 bug	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 accommodate	
no-cause	 contrasts.	 The	 latter	 is	 a	 bug	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 accommo-
date	 intimately	 related,	 same-modality	 contrasts.	 Yet	 Clarke-Doane,	
Wielenberg,	and	others	mistake	it	 for	a	feature.	This	mistake	should	
be	rectified;	modalism	should	be	rejected.
6.  Beyond Modality
Modalism	 fails	 because	 it	 cannot	 accommodate	 same-modality	 con-
trasts.	My	 view	 is	 that	 this	 is	 because	 intuitions	 about	 coincidence	
are	 fundamentally	 explanatory,	 and	 some	 explanatory	 relations	 are	
hyperintensional	and	therefore	cannot	be	captured	by	looking	at	pos-
sible	worlds.	If	I’m	right,	the	next	question	is	whether	this	exposes	a	
problem	with	counterfactual	models	of	explanation,	or	merely	with	a	
modal	semantics	for	counterfactuals.	If	the	latter,	we	may	be	able	to	
salvage	counterfactual	conditions’	role	in	testing	for	or	even	defining	
explanatory	connections,	even	as	we	embrace	explanationism	as	the	
correct	 account	 of	 the	 intuitive	 roots	 of	 our	 judgements	 about	 epis-
temic	coincidence.	 I	 take	no	official	position	on	this	possibility	here,	
though	I	raise	some	concerns	in	§6.2.	
Some	readers	may	be	tempted	by	an	alternative	view.	They	may	take	
my	arguments	to	show,	as	just	suggested,	that	a	modal	semantics	for	
counterfactuals	is	too	limiting.	But	they	may	remain	insistent	that	intu-
itions	about	coincidence	are	fundamentally	about	counterfactuals.	In	
§6.1,	I	argue	that	the	counterfactual	conditions	required	to	accommo-
date	our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence	(to	whatever	extent	
they	can	do	so)	support	explanationism	over	such	counterfactualism.	
But	it	is	crucial	to	be	clear	both	that and	why this	argument	will	be	dif-
ferent	from	those	against	causationism	and	modalism.	I	will	not show	
that	counterfactualism	fails	to	accommodate	one	or	more	coincidence	
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semantics.	By	far	the	most	popular	and	natural	strategy	here	is	to	de-
velop	hypermodal conditions	that	look	at	impossible	worlds	as	well	as	
possible	ones.	Field	anticipates	this:
Lewis	 is	 assuming	 a	 controversial	 connection	 between	
counterfactuals	and	necessity.	…	[E]ven	those	who	think	
that	 there	 is	 some	 sort	 of	 “absolute	 necessity”	 to	math-
ematics	may	find	counter-mathematical	conditionals	per-
fectly	intelligible	in	certain	contexts.	(Field	1989,	237)
Here	is	a	recent	discussion	of	a	hypersensitivity	condition,	from	Gideon	
Rosen:
The	 truths	 of	 pure	 mathematics	 are	 presumably	 meta-
physically	 necessary	 truths,	 but	we	 can	 coherently	 sup-
pose	 many	 of	 them	 to	 be	 false	 by	 considering	 worlds	
in	which	 there	are	no	mathematical	objects	of	any	 sort,	
worlds	in	which	all	sets	are	finite,	and	so	on.	Many	of	our	
mathematical	beliefs	will	 then	fail	 the	sensitivity	 test:	 if	
there	had	been	no	numbers	(or	infinite	sets),	these	beliefs	
would	have	been	just	as	they	are.	(Rosen	forthcoming)
Consider	how	this	fits	with	our	judgements	about	Bad Math	and	
Good Math.	In	the	former,	Leo	believes	that	89	is	a	prime	number	be-
cause	he	sees	it	on	a	mislabeled	list	of	Fibonacci	numbers.	It	is	natural	
to	think	that	if	(per impossibile)	89	weren’t	prime,	it	would	still	appear	
on	the	mislabeled	list,	and	Leo	would	still	believe	it	to	be	prime.	His	
belief	is	hyperinsensitive.	It	is	also	natural	to	think	that	if	89	weren’t	
prime,	it	would	have	more	or	fewer	factors	than	1	and	itself,	Lisa’s	cal-
culations	would	reveal	this,	and	she	wouldn’t	believe	it	 to	be	prime.	
Her	belief	is	hypersensitive.43 
43.	 These	counterfactual	judgements	are	natural	but	not	required.	Perhaps	if	89	
weren’t	 prime,	 the	 conditions	 for	 life	wouldn’t	 obtain,	 and	 so	 neither	 Leo	
nor	 Lisa	would	 believe	 anything	 at	 all.	 Or,	more	 relevantly	 to	 our	 discus-
sion,	suppose	it	 turns	out	that	 it	 is	no	mathematical	coincidence	that	89	 is	
both	prime	and	a	Fibonacci	number,	 that	89	 is	a	Fibonacci	number	 in	part	
because	it	is	prime.	In	that	case,	arguably	the	closest	impossible	world	where	
change	took	place	between	9:59	and	10:00;	it	is	unclear	how	the	coun-
terfactualist	can	account	for	the	irrelevance	of	that	change.42
By	contrast,	the	explanationist’s	answer	is	simple.	The	thought	be-
hind	the	sensitivity	test is	that	if	Russ	wouldn’t	have	gotten	things	right	
if	the	truth	were	minimally	different,	the	best	explanation	is	that	he	isn’t	
actually connected	to	the	truth.	But	no	such	explanation	is	required	for	
Russ’	getting	things	wrong	at	10:01;	that	can	be	fully	explained	by	the	
fact	that	the	clock	broke	just	before	10:01.	The	9:59-world	has	no	such	
failing,	so	it	is	the	one	to	go	with.
Counterfactualists	 may	 be	 unimpressed,	 however,	 for	 they	 may	
agree	with	my	narrative	up	to	a	point:	sensitivity	is	indeed	a	misguid-
ed	adaptation	of	a	counterfactual	causal	model.	Safety	has	been	gain-
ing	ground	precisely	because	it	is	a	direct	representative	of	a	far	more	
plausible	pretheoretical	notion	of	coincidence:	correlations	are	coinci-
dental	insofar	as	the	correlates	almost weren’t	correlated.	
I	agree	that	this	 is	more	plausible,	but	still	 think	it	ultimately	mis-
guided.	First,	it	is	unclear	whether	safety	can	account	for	Okay Clock 
at	all,	especially	once	we	add	further	details.	Suppose	both	Bertie	and	
Russ	are	deeply	engrossed	 in	a	book,	and	 look	up	at	 the	clock	only	
because	the	phone	rings	(an	old	desk	phone	that	doesn’t	display	the	
time).	It’s	a	friend	calling	with	the	exciting	and	unexpected	news	that	
she’s	won	the	lottery.	Bertie	and	Russ	offer	congratulations,	chat	for	a	
few	minutes,	and	hang	up.	At	10:10,	their	mothers	call	to	check	in.	This	
strongly	suggests	 that	 there	 is	a	close	world	—	equally	close	 in	both	
cases,	and	arguably	even	closer	than	the	9:59-world	in	terms	of	overall	
similarity	—	where	the	friend	doesn’t	win	the	lottery	and	doesn’t	call,	
and	Bertie	and	Russ	don’t	answer	the	phone	until	their	mothers	call	at	
10:10.	In	that	nearby	world,	they	both	get	things	wrong.
Second,	as	we’ve	seen,	safety	is	a	modal	condition,	and	therefore	
cannot	accommodate	same-modality	contrasts.	This	brings	us	finally	
to	counterfactualist	strategies	for	overcoming	the	limitations	of	modal	
42.	 Note	 that	 a	 counterfactualist	 who	 disagrees	with	me	 and	 takes	 this	 to	 be	
a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence	 would	 similarly	 need	 to	 explain	 why	 the	
10:01-world	is	closer.
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explanationist	 has	what	 is	 by	 comparison	 a	 clear,	 simple	 story:	 our	
goal	 is	 to	determine	whether	our	beliefs	are	connected	to	 the	 truth;	
a	natural	way	to	test	for	this	is	to	vary	the	truth	and	see	if	our	beliefs	
change	to	match;	the	variations	required	may	be	highly	context-sensi-
tive;	when	it	comes	to	necessary	truths,	the	smallest	change	required	
may	take	us	to	an	impossible	world.
6.2 Hypermodals and Hope
In	this	section,	I	raise	two	methodological	concerns	about	the	use	of	
counterfactual,	 and	 specifically	 hypermodal,	 conditions	 given	 expla-
nationism,	and	say	a	bit	about	how	I	think	we	should	proceed.
First,	 given	explanationism,	we	 can	 rely	on	 counterfactual	 condi-
tions	 only	where	 all	 relevant	 explanatory	 relations	 can	be	modeled	
counterfactually.	Whether	this	will	always	be	the	case	is	a	point	of	con-
tention	amongst	metaphysicians	and	philosophers	of	science	working	
on	explanation.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 those	of	us	not	working	 in	 the	
relevant	areas	should	be	wary	of	sticking	our	necks	out	further	than	
necessary.
The	 second	 concern	 stems	 from	 a	 hypothesis:	 in	 standard	 cases,	
people	tend	to	make	accurate	counterfactual	judgements	only	because	
they	have	a	decent	intuitive	or	theoretical	grasp	of	relevant	explana-
tory	relations	—	e.g.,	 the	ones	that	explain	why,	had	Bertie	and	Russ	
not	looked	at	the	clock	at	10:00,	they	would	have	done	so	at	10:10.	In	
the	absence	of	any	sense	of	the	explanatory	connections	between	our	
mathematical	beliefs	and	the	mathematical	facts,	hypermodal	tests	are	
meant	to	provide	evidence	of	(or	perhaps	even	define)	the	presence	or	
absence	of	such	connections,	and	thus	to	help	either	alleviate	or	vin-
dicate	worries	about	epistemic	coincidence.	But	there	is	tension	here.	
For	these	tests	to	be	useful,	we	need	to	be	good	at	making	judgements	
about	counterpossibles;	 if	my	hypothesis	 is	 true,	 this	 likely	 requires	
our	having	a	decent	grasp	of	relevant	non-causal	explanatory	relations.	
Yet	it	is	our	lack	of	such	a	grasp	that	generates	a	need	for	these	tests	in	
the	first	place.
As	 I’ve	argued,	however,	 sensitivity	doesn’t	fit	well	with	 counter-
factualism,	because	determinations	of	the	closest	world	at	which	the	
truth	is	different	are	motivated	by	the	need	to	isolate	the	impact	of	the	
truth	on	our	beliefs	(or	vice	versa),	much	as	Field	anticipated.	
The	obvious	alternative	 is	 to	develop	a	hypersafety condition.	But	
what	would	such	a	condition	look	like?	If	the	intuitive	idea	is	supposed	
to	be	that	coincidences	are	correlations	that	almost weren’t	correlations,	
we’d	need	a	sense	in	which	necessary correlations	almost weren’t	cor-
relations.	I	can	think	of	only	one	sense	in	which	this	is	true:	they	almost 
weren’t	if	there	is	no	explanatory	connection	between	the	correlates.	
Here	is	a	related	issue:	Given	the	variety	of	explanatory	relations,	
in	 both	 form	 and	 particular	 detail,	 it	 is	 predictable	 under	 explana-
tionism	that	the	particular	counterfactuals	and	accounts	of	proximity	
required	to	capture	various	cases	will	vary,	perhaps	quite	widely.	By	
contrast,	assuming	the	pretheoretical	notion	of	coincidence	is	at	least	
somewhat unified,	counterfactualists	should	expect	a	 fairly	stable	set	
of	conditions.	Now	suppose	counterfactualists	claim	in	some	case	that	
some	impossible	world	is	close	enough	to	the	actual	world	to	generate	
coincidence.	They	will	need	to	square	this	with	the	claim	that,	in	other	
cases,	quite close	worlds	seem	too	far to	generate	coincidence	—	for	in-
stance,	the	world	in	which	Russ	doesn’t	look	at	the	clock	until	10:10.	
It	 is	hard	 to	 see	how	 to	do	 this	while	maintaining	a	 stable	 sense	of	
‘almost’.44	(This	issue	will	come	up	again	at	the	end	of	§7.)
As	anticipated,	there	is	no	impossibility	proof	in	any	of	the	above.	
My	goal	has	been	to	expose	how	difficult	it	is	for	counterfactualists	to	
account	for	both	the	nature	and	variation	in	the	counterfactuals	and	
accounts	 of	 proximity	 required	 to	 systematize	 our	 judgements.	 The	
89	is	not	prime	is	also	one	in	which	it	is	not	a	Fibonacci	number	and	therefore	
does	not	appear	on	the	list	of	Fibonacci	numbers	in	Leo’s	book!	(There	are	in	
fact	mathematical	relations	between	primeness	and	the	Fibonacci	sequence	
[see,	e.g.,	“Relationship	between	Primes	and	Fibonacci	Sequence”	n.d.],	but	I	
confess	I	do	not	fully	understand	them,	and	am	certainly	unclear	on	how	the	
relevant	counterpossibles	would	fall	out.)
44.	 If	you	were	tempted	by	the	objection	discussed	in	note	35,	I	ask	you	to	revisit	
the	questions	asked	there	with	this	worry	in	mind.
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mathematical	facts.	But	Lange	also	has	views	about	mathematical	ex-
planations	of	quotidian	facts.	For	example:
The	fact	 that	23	cannot	be	divided	evenly	by	3	explains	
why	Mother	fails	every	time	she	tries	to	distribute	exactly	
23	strawberries	evenly	among	her	3	children	without	cut-
ting	any	(strawberries	—	or	children!).	(Lange	2016,	6)
Very	roughly,	Lange’s	view	is	that	such	mathematical	explanations	
are	 one	 kind	 of	 “explanation	 by	 constraint”,	 wherein	 a	 pure	mathe-
matical	fact	—	here,	that	23	cannot	be	divided	evenly	by	3	—	serves	as	
a	constraint	on	the	possible	causal	relations	that	might	obtain,	ruling	
out	Mother’s	even	distribution	of	the	uncut	strawberries	to	her	uncut	
children.	
This	 raises	 a	 possible	 solution	 to	 the	 Benacerraf	 Problem,	 if	 the	
causal	 forces	that	explain	our	beliefs	are	amongst	those	constrained	
by	the	mathematical	facts.	Perhaps	Mother	believes	that	23	cannot	be	
divided	evenly	by	3	because	that	very	fact	has	constrained	her	experi-
ences	—	possible	and	actual	—	in	ways	that	lead	her	to	think	this!	I	am	
not	endorsing	this	here,	nor	insisting	that	it	cannot	be	expressed	coun-
terfactually.47	I	am	simply	offering	the	hopeful	suggestion	that	focusing	
directly	on	accounts	 like	Lange’s	may	open	avenues	 for	meeting	 the	
Benacerraf	Problem	head-on.	
47.	 Though	Lange	(2016,	86–7)	himself	raises	the	worry	that	his	view	may	be	in-
consistent	with	counterfactual	accounts	of	explanation:	“Some	of	the	‘expla-
nations	by	constraint’	that	I	have	drawn	from	scientific	practice	are	deemed	
to	be	 explanatorily	 impotent	by	 some	accounts	of	 scientific	 explanation	…	
consider,	 for	example,	Woodward’s	[(2003)]	manipulationist	account	of	sci-
entific	explanation,	according	to	which	an	explanans	must	provide	informa-
tion	about	how	the	explanandum	would	have	been	different	under	various	
counterfactual	changes	 to	 the	variables	figuring	 in	 the	explanans	…	These	
criteria	rule	out	many	typical	explanations	by	constraint	….	[T]here	are	no	
obvious	variables	to	be	changed	…	in	the	fact	that	23	is	not	divided	evenly	
into	whole	numbers	by	3	….”
Combining	 these	 concerns:	 if	 developing	 hypermodal	 condi-
tions	requires	counterfactual	models	of	all	relevant	forms	of	explana-
tion	—	the	 availability	 of	which	 is	 far	 from	 certain	—	and	developing	
such	conditions	requires	an	implicit	or	explicit	account	of	non-causal	
explanation	 anyway,	 relying	 too	 heavily	 on	 these	 conditions	 seems	
both	 theoretically	 and	dialectically	 inadvisable.45	This	 is	not	 just	be-
cause	 such	 conditions	might	 trivialize	matters	 as	modal	 conditions	
have,	but	because	they	may	in	fact	lead	us	towards	unwarranted	pessi-
mism.	Recall	Rosen’s	remarks	above.	He	claims	without	argument	that	
“if	 there	had	been	no	numbers	 (or	 infinite	sets),	 these	beliefs	would	
have	been	just	as	they	are”.	But	whether	this	is	the	case	depends	pre-
cisely	on	whether	the	nonexistence	of	numbers	or	infinite	sets	would	
have	led	to	changes	in	our	beliefs.	Perhaps	if	we	had	a	good	account	
of	 the	 possible	 explanatory	 connections	 between	 our	mathematical	
beliefs	and	the	mathematical	truths,	their	hyperinsensitivity	wouldn’t	
seem	a	foregone	conclusion!
This	brings	me	to	the	intended	hopefulness	of	my	defense	of	expla-
nationism.	 I	believe	we	 stand	 the	best	 chance	of	 solving	 the	Benac-
erraf	Problem	and	 its	 relatives	by	expanding	our	views	about	expla-
nation,	perhaps	to	places	counterfactual	conditions	cannot	follow.	I’ll	
close	 this	section	with	a	very inchoate	gesture	 in	 this	direction.46	As	
noted	 in	 §3,	 Lange	 has	 views	 about	 explanatory	 relations	 between	
45.	 Inadvisable	 for	me,	at	 least;	 if	 you’re	deploying	hypermodal	 conditions	be-
cause	you	have	a	relevant	favored	theory	of	non-causal	explanation,	have	at	
it!
46.	 The	one	 account	 of	 this	 kind	 in	 the	 literature	 I	 know	of	 comes	 from	 John	
Bengson	(2015),	whose	view	implies	that	in	Good Math,	the	fact	that	89	is	
prime	partially constitutes	Lisa’s	belief,	but	that	it	fails	to	similarly	constitute	
Leo’s	 belief	 in	Bad Math.	 Bengson’s	motivating	 discussion	 is	 phenomenal,	
and	a	number	of	the	points	I	make	here	echo	his.	I	find	his	positive	proposal	
unattractively	 limited,	however,	as	 it	names	an	explanatory	relation	(partial	
constitution)	 but	 offers	 no	 account	 whatsoever	 of	 how	 the	 connection	 is	
made,	or	why	we	should	expect	 it.	He	tells	us	nothing,	 for	 instance,	about	
how	accurate	calculation	gets	89’s	primeness	to	partially	constitute	Lisa’s	be-
lief	in	it,	while	Leo’s	consulting	a	mislabeled	list	does	not,	or	why	we	should	
expect	this	to	be	the	case.
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Source.	None	of	these	bear	any	explanatory	connection	to	the	truth;	
their	correctness	is	coincidental.
The	one	unclear	case	 is	Bad Sheep.	There	 is	an	explanatory	con-
nection	between	the	source	of	Mary’s	belief	—	the	sheep-façade	—	and	
the	truth:	the	façade	explains	the	fact	that	there	is	a	sheep	in	the	field.	
This	might	be	 taken	 to	suggest	 that	 the	correctness	of	 the	source	 is	
non-coincidental,	and	thus	that	this	is	not	a	case	of	source	coincidence.	
But	this	 is	too	quick.	Bad Sheep	shows	that	not	all	explanatory	con-
nections	eliminate	coincidence	between	beliefs	and	the	truth.	It	may	
likewise	show	that	not	all	connections	eliminate	coincidence	between	
sources and	the	truth.48 
In	 cases	 of	 source	 coincidence,	 belief-truth	 coincidences	 obtain	
because	there	are	source-truth	coincidences.	The	explanationist	might	
naturally	suspect	that	some	source-truth	coincidences	likewise	obtain	
because	of	 further coincidences.	 If	 those	 further	coincidences	are	ex-
planatory	—	e.g.,	if	they	obtain	because	of	the	absence	of	some	other	
required	explanatory	connection	—	it	may	yet	be	possible	to	develop	a	
thoroughgoingly	explanationist	account.49 
48.	Notice	that	we	can	illuminate	the	same	phenomenon	by	altering	Bengson’s	
own	“veridical	hallucination”	example	of	source	coincidence.	For	instance:	A	
brain	injury	causes	Joanna	to	hallucinate	that	there	is	an	anvil	present.	There	
is an	anvil	present,	but	Joanna	does	not	see	it.	The	anvil	present	is	the	anvil	
that	fell	on	her	head	and	caused	the	brain	injury	that	caused	her	to	halluci-
nate	that	there	is	an	anvil	present.
49.	 This	is	an	instance	of	one	of	two	broad	avenues	open	to	explanationists:	deny	
relevant	 contrasts	 or	 deny	 that	 the	 explanatory	 connections	 are	 the	 same.	
Here,	they	could	deny	the	contrast	by	insisting	either	that	Bad Sheep is	not	
a	case	of	coincidence,	or	that	Good Sheep	is.	Neither	seems	promising.	They	
could	deny	that	the	explanatory	connections	are	the	same	by	holding	either	
that	 the	 belief-truth	 connections	 are	 different,	 or	 that	 some	 further	 impor-
tant	connection	is	missing.	Obviously	I	think	the	latter	is	promising,	but	the	
strategy	could	potentially	be	reframed	to	be	of	the	former	kind.	Roughly,	one	
might	claim	not	that	one	connection	fails	to	eliminate	coincidence	because	of	
the	absence	of	a	further	connection,	but	rather	that	one	connection	is	severed 
by	the	presence	or	absence	of	some	further	connection.	I	won’t	pursue	this	
further	here,	and	I	don’t	think	it’s	plausible	in	this	case,	but	I	think	it	might	be	
more	promising	with	respect	to	doxastic	coincidence.
7.  Towards a Complete Explanationist Account of Epistemic 
Coincidence
I	have	now	completed	my	defense	of	Explanationist as	a	sufficient	
condition	 for	epistemic	coincidence.	 I	motivated	 it	 as	an	adaptation	
of	an	account	of	mathematical	coincidence	(§3);	argued	that	it	under-
girds	the	Benacerraf	Problem	(§4);	and	defended	its	superiority	to	cau-
sationism	(§§2,4),	modalism	(§5),	and	counterfactualism	(§6).
However,	 if	explanationists	are	 to	accommodate	all	of	our	 judge-
ments	about	epistemic	coincidence,	 they	must	also	offer	a	sufficient	
condition	for	avoiding it.	This	means	addressing	apparent	same-cause 
contrasts,	like	that	between	Bad Sheep	and	Good Sheep.	As	noted	in	
§1,	I	believe	that	such	contrasts	have	provided	fuel	for	counterfactual-
ism	and,	more	specifically,	for	safety.	In	this	section,	I	aim	to	show	both	
that	explanationists	have	promising	avenues	for	dealing	with	apparent	
same-cause	—	or,	more	worryingly	 for	 them,	 same-explanation	—	con-
trasts,	while	competitors	face	problems	paralleling	those	raised	in	§6.1.	
To	begin,	 it	will	be	useful	 to	mark	 John	Bengson’s	distinction	be-
tween	source coincidence and	doxastic coincidence (he	says	“accidentality”,	
but	the	terminological	shift	is	harmless):
In	 veridical	 hallucination,	 sensory	 or	 intellectual,	 what	
is	 accidentally	 correct	 is	 a	 potential	 source	 of	 belief	 (a	
“source	 state”),	 such	 as	 a	 perceptual	 experience	 or	 intu-
ition.	Such	source accidentality	can	be	contrasted	with	dox-
astic accidentality,	where	what	is	accidentally	correct	is	not	
the	source	state	but	a	subsequent	belief.	(Bengson	2015,	
n.	10)
Most	 of	 the	 coincidences	 we’ve	 looked	 at	 so	 far	 are	 clear	 cases	
of	 source	 coincidence:	 in	Bad Clock,	 the	 source	of	Bertie’s	 belief	 is	
the	clock;	 in	Bad Math,	 the	source	of	Leo’s	belief	 is	 the	appearance	
of	"89"	on	the	mislabeled	list	of	Fibonacci	numbers;	in	Bad Necessity 
and	Simply Bad,	the	source	of	Eula’s	belief	is	the	randomly	outputting	
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I	am	not	endorsing	 this	view,	but	 I	 think	 it	nicely	 illustrates	 that	
there	are	potential	explanationist	 strategies	 for	accommodating	con-
trasts	 like	 that	between	Bad Sheep	 and	Good Sheep:	 if	 there	 is	 an	
explanatory	 connection	 that	 fails	 to	 eliminate	 coincidence,	 this	 is	
because	avoiding	epistemic	coincidence	 requires	 further explanatory	
connections.	As	we’ve	 seen,	 at	 least	one	 such	 strategy	draws	on	an	
independently	motivated	account	of	knowledge.51
Turn	now	to	doxastic	coincidences.	Bengson’s	primary	example	of	
doxastic	coincidence	is	Goldman’s	fake	barn	case,	which	I	mentioned	
earlier	and	now	adapt	as	half	of	a	coincidence	contrast:
Bad Barn			Allie	sees	a	barn	in	a	field	and	thereby	comes	
to	believe	there	is	a	barn	in	the	field.	But	she’s	in	fake	barn	
country,	where	 there	are	barn	 façades	everywhere.	The	
barn	she	sees	is	the	only	real	barn	for	miles	around.
Good Barn			Vin	sees	a	barn	in	a	field	and	thereby	comes	
to	believe	 there	 is	 a	barn	 in	 the	field.	That’s	 the	whole	
story.
Intuitively,	Bad Barn	is	a	case	of	epistemic	coincidence,	while	Good 
Barn	is	not.	The	worry,	as	before,	is	that	the	explanatory	relations	be-
tween	the	beliefs	and	truth	are	the	same	in	both	cases,	precluding	an	
explanationist	account	of	our	judgements.
In	response,	explanationists	may	be	able	to	deploy	the	strategy	ex-
plored	 above.	 In	 both	Bad Barn	 and	Good Barn,	 there	 is	 (i)	 an	 ex-
planatory	connection	between	the	belief	and	the	truth	and	(ii)	an	ex-
planatory	connection	between	the	source	of	the	belief	and	the	truth:	
the	belief	is	explained	by	the	barn	itself,	which	is	obviously	connected	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	barn	present.	 Is	 there	 (iii)	 an	 explanatory	
51.	 One	might	 naturally	wonder	whether	 a	 parallel	 strategy	 could	 be	 used	 to	
salvage	modalism	 or	 counterfactualism.	 But	 the	 fundamental	 problems	 re-
main.	First,	so	long	as	the	explanatory	relations	in	question	can	be	modally	
stabilized	(either	because	they	are	necessary	relations	or	through	the	use	of	
demons,	genetic	determinism,	etc.),	modalism	will	sometimes	fail	to	get	the	
right	results.	Second,	while	these	further	relations	may be	expressible	coun-
terfactually,	the	fundamental	intuitions	remain	explanatory.
This	is	not	ad	hoc;	in	fact,	it	sits	well	with	independently	motivated	
positions	in	epistemology.	Consider,	for	example,	Marc	Alspector-Kel-
ly’s	proposal:	
S	knows	that	P	iff	S’s	belief	that	P	is	produced	in	such	a	
way	as	to	contain	the	information	that	P,	and	S’s	belief	is	
produced	that	way	precisely	because	its	being	produced	
that	way	contains	the	information	that	P	(Alspector-Kelly	
2006,	292–3).50
We	may	 adapt	 this	 as	 an	 explanationist	 account	 by	 holding	 that	
avoiding	epistemic	coincidence	 requires	not	only	 (i)	an	explanatory	
connection	between	beliefs	and	the	truth,	but	also	(ii)	an	explanatory	
connection	between	the	source	of	the	belief	and	the	truth,	as	well	as	
(iii)	an	explanatory	connection	between	that explanatory	connection	
and	the	fact	that	the	agent	consults	the	source	she	consults.
This	gets	the	right	results	in	Bad Sheep	and	Good Sheep.	In	both	
cases,	there	is	(i)	an	explanatory	connection	between	the	beliefs	and	
the	truth.	 In	Good Sheep,	Bo’s	source	 is	(inference	from)	the	sheep-
façade.	There	 is	 (ii)	 an	 explanatory	 connection	between	her	 source	
and	the	truth:	roughly,	the	sheep-façade	explains	her	inference,	and	
the	fact	that	things	that	look	like	sheep	either	are sheep	or	have	sheep	
hiding	behind	them	explains	why	the	inference	is	a	good	one.	What’s	
more,	 (iii)	 Bo	 relies	 on	 this	 inference	 from	 experience	 precisely	 be-
cause	she	knows	about	the	connection	just	mentioned	(and	is	there-
fore	ex hypothesi	connected	to	it).	
In	Bad Sheep,	Mary’s	source	 is	 the	sheep-façade.	There	 is	 (ii)	an	
explanatory	connection	between	her	source	and	the	truth:	the	sheep-
façade	explains	the	presence	of	the	sheep.	But	there	is	no	connection	
between	this	and	Mary’s	relying	on	her	source;	she	does	so	because	
things	that	look	like	sheep	typically	are	sheep,	not	because	things	that	
look	like	sheep	typically	are	or attract sheep	(and	the	latter	disjunct	is	
the	“active”	one	here).	Condition	(iii)	is	not	met.
50.	Matt	Lutz	(m.s.)	offers	a	similar	theory,	but	his	is	internalist,	requiring	that	the	
source-truth	explanatory	connection	be	as	the	agent	“takes	it	to	be”.
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Most	 judge	 this	 to	be	a	 case	of	 epistemic	 coincidence.	 (Indeed,	per-
haps	Always	need	only	walk	around	with	a	single	fake-diamond-wear-
er	to	generate	coincidence.)
Next,	suppose	Observer	sees	Sometimes	wearing	a	real	diamond	
ring	on	the	one	day	per	week	she	doesn’t	wear	a	fake	one.	Observer	
forms	the	belief	that	Sometimes	is	wearing	a	diamond	ring.	Gendler	
and	Hawthorne	tell	us	that	many	think	this	is	likewise	a	case	of	epis-
temic	coincidence,	though	my	intuitions	here	are	somewhat	less	clear.	
But	now	suppose	Always	and	Sometimes	are	walking	around	together	
on	the	one	day	Sometimes	is	wearing	her	real	ring:
If	 the	 casual	 observer	would	not	 know	 that	 Sometimes	
was	wearing	a	diamond	ring,	then	presumably	she	would	
not	know	that	Always	was.	After	all,	 there	might	be	no	
intrinsic	difference	between	the	two	rings,	and	minimal	
differences	between	their	wearers’	fingers,	hands,	clothes,	
etc.	But	if	so,	then	something	remarkable	is	going	on.	Can	
you	really	prevent	a	casual	observer	 from	knowing	that	
someone	is	wearing	a	diamond	ring	by	walking	around	
beside	 her,	 wearing	 a	 real	 diamond,	 with	 the	 habit	 of	
wearing	fakes	on	other	days?	Could	epistemic	contagion	
really	be	so	easy?	(Gendler	and	Hawthorne	2005,	336)
Gendler	and	Hawthorne	 tell	us	 that	 theorists	are	split	on	 the	an-
swers	to	these	questions:	(1)	some	claim	that	Observer	can	know	that	
Always	 is	wearing	 a	 diamond,	 but	 not	 that	 Sometimes	 is;	 (2)	 some	
claim	that	Observer	cannot	know	that	Always	is	wearing	a	diamond	
while	she	is	with	Sometimes;	(3)	some	claim	that	Observer	can	know	
that	both	are	wearing	diamonds.	
I	find	(1)	and	(3)	tempting.	It	seems	to	me	that	Observer	can	know	
that	Always	is	wearing	a	diamond,	but	(as	before)	I	am	less	clear	about	
Sometimes.	However,	as	Gendler	and	Hawthorne	point	out,	there	is	a	
pressure	of	symmetry pushing	us	towards	(2).	The	similarities	between	
Observer’s	experiences	of	Always	and	Sometimes	push	away	from	(1).	
connection	between	that explanatory	connection	and	the	fact	that	the	
agents	consult	the	sources	they	consult?	
We	may	presume	that	both	Allie	and	Vin	treat	the	barn	as	a	source	
(much	as	anyone	would)	because	things	that	look	like	barns	tend	to	be 
barns.	In	Good Barn,	this	may	well	meet	condition	(iii):	perhaps,	for	
instance,	the	fact	that	Vin	is	having	an	experience	of	a	barn	while	look-
ing	at	an	actual	barn	is	partly	constitutive	of	the	fact	that	barn-experi-
ences	tend	to	be	caused	by	barns.	In	Bad Barn,	however,	this	connec-
tion	is	arguably	severed.	In	fake	barn	country,	barn-experiences	don’t 
tend	to	be	caused	by	barns;	they	tend	to	be	caused	by	barn-façades.52
This	is	all	inchoate,	and	there	are	many	lingering	questions.	Why	
does	the	context	of	belief-formation	matter?	Why	is	the	right	context	
“fake	barn	country”	as	opposed	to	“this	particular	field”?53	Suppose	Al-
lie	and	Vin	actually	drive	through	the	same	area,	and	were	meant	to	
do	so	on	the	same	day,	but	Vin	is	running	late	and	just	happens	to	be	
travelling	 the	day	after	all	 the	 façades	have	been	 replaced	with	 real	
barns;	would	that	make	Good Barn	a	case	of	coincidence,	too?	
There	may	be	answers	to	these	questions,	in	which	case	something	
like	 the	above	may	work	 for	 the	explanationist.	But	either	way,	 it	 is	
important	that	these	are	precisely	the	sorts	of	questions	that	have	led	
some	to	worry	that	our	 intuitions	about	doxastic	coincidence	are	 in-
consistent,	or	at	least	vague,	and	that	there	may	be	no	way	to	capture	
them	all	on	any account	of	epistemic	coincidence. 
Consider	 a	 progression	 of	 cases	 from	 Gendler	 and	 Hawthorne	
(2005).	 They	 discuss	 a	 case	much	 like	Bad Barn	where	 a	 character	
named	Always	walks	around	wearing	a	real	diamond	ring,	along	with	
a	bunch	of	 people	wearing	 fake	ones.	Observer	happens	 to	 look	 at	
Always,	and	forms	the	belief	that	Always	is	wearing	a	diamond	ring.	
52.	 Compare:	 “Since	no	more	of	 the	object	 is	 seen	 than	 its	presenting	surface,	
where	the	belief	induced	concerns	the	kind	of	object	whose	surface	it	is,	con-
dition	[iii]	requires	that	the	agent’s	environment	be	one	in	which	such	sur-
faces	are,	at	least	typically,	of	objects	of	the	sort	the	agent	perceptually	judges	
it	to	be	(which	is	false	in	Goldman’s	example)”	(Alspector-Kelly	2006,	n.	14).
53.	 This,	 like	a	number	of	 the	 issues	raised	herein,	 is	related	to	“the	generality	
problem”	for	reliabilism	(e.g.,	Conee	and	Feldman	1998).
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At	the	end	of	the	day,	explanationists	may	not	be	able	to	capture	
all	 of	 our	 judgements	 about	 doxastic	 coincidences.	 But	 this	 is	 a	 far	
smaller	bullet	than	many	of	those	counterfactualism	has	been	left	to	
bite,	and	may	well	be	among	them,	too.	In	any	case,	we	as	yet	have	no	
clear	same-explanation	contrasts;	a	complete	explanationist	account	
of	epistemic	coincidence	remains	possible.
8.  Conclusion
8.1 Skepticism About the Analysis of Knowledge
As	noted	at	 the	outset,	many	philosophers	hold	out	hope	for	a	solu-
tion	to	the	Gettier	problem.	But	it	is	becoming	increasingly	popular	to	
give	up	this	hope,	concluding	that	knowledge	is	unanalyzable.	I	obvi-
ously	cannot	address	all	relevant	views	here,	but	it	is	worth	briefly	not-
ing	how	my	discussion	relates	to	the	two	major	reasons	Williamson	
(2002)	—	arguably	the	most	prominent	figure	in	this	camp	—	gives	for	
such	skepticism	(and	for	his	“knowledge-first”	program).
Williamson’s	first	reason	is	inductive pessimism. We	have	been	trying	
and	failing	 to	solve	 the	Gettier	problem	for	over	half	a	century.	Wil-
liamson	thinks	that	we’ve	failed	because	knowledge	is	unanalyzable.	
I	think	it	at	least	as	likely	that	we	have	failed	because	modalism	and	
counterfactualism	have	led	us	in	the	wrong	direction.	
Williamson’s	 second	 reason	 is	 that	knowledge	 is	prime:	 it	 cannot	
be	analyzed	as	a	conjunction	of	internal	and	external	conditions.	This	
falls	squarely	in	line	with	my	arguments.	We	are	interested	in	the	na-
ture	 of	 coincidence between	 something	 internal	 (belief)	 and	 some-
thing	external	(truth).	One	might	reframe	my	argument	that	there	are	
same-modality	contrasts	(in	§5)	as	an	argument	that	modal	conditions	
are	composite:	at	least	in	some	cases,	a	modal	condition	may	hold	be-
cause	of	the	conjunction	of	something	internal	—	e.g.,	Eula’s	necessary	
belief	that	certain	numbers	are	prime	—	and	something	external	—	e.g.,	
the	necessary	fact	that	those	numbers	are	prime.	Explanatory	relations,	
by	 contrast,	 are	 prime:	whether	 there	 is	 an	 explanatory	 connection	
The	 similarities	 between	Observer’s	 experiences	 of	 Sometimes	 and	
Always-accompanied-by-fake-ring-wearers	push	away	from	(3).	
My	hope,	obviously,	is	that	some	condition	can	account	for	these	
and	further	asymmetries.	Either	way,	I	submit	once	again	that	the	av-
enues	typically	explored	for	developing	such	a	condition	speak	in	fa-
vor	of	explanationism	over	counterfactualism.	As	evidence,	consider	
one	final	passage:
Advocates	 of	 (3)	 differed	 on	 what	 might	 explain	 this	
asymmetry.	 Some	 subscribed	 to	 a	 version	of	what	 they	
called	the	GAZE PRINCIPLE.	According	to	that	principle,	
candidate-defeaters	are	relevant	in	cases	where	we	leave	
the	world	as	it	is,	altering	only	the	observer’s	perceptual	
orientation	within	 it,	 and	 irrelevant	 in	 cases	where	we	
leave	 the	 observer’s	 perceptual	 orientation	 as	 it	 is,	 al-
tering	only	features	of	the	world	around	her.	In	the	first	
sort	of	 case,	one	might	 say,	 the	defeaters	are	 there,	but	
the	observer’s	gaze	happens	not	to	fall	upon	them;	in	the	
second	sort	of	case,	her	gaze	 is	 there,	but	 the	defeaters	
on	which	it	might	have	fallen	happen	not	to	be	around.	
(Opponents	objected	 that	 the	principle	was	ad hoc,	 con-
tending	that	there	are	plenty	of	cases	where	non-present	
but	eminently	possible	fakes	clearly	do	seem	to	destroy	
knowledge.)	(Gendler	and	Hawthorne	2005,	337)
This	 echoes	 concerns	 raised	 about	 counterfactualism	 in	 §6.1.	 It	
is	unclear	how	counterfactualists	can	explain	why	only	one	of	these	
counterfactuals	is	relevant	here,	especially	if	this	isn’t	so	in	other	con-
texts.	 Once	 again,	 explanationism	 has	 resources	 counterfactualism	
lacks.	Explanationists	claim	that	we	are	interested	in	whether	there	is	
some	relevant	explanatory	connection	in	these	cases;	perhaps	in	this	
context,	 if	we	alter	things	one	way,	we	are	 likely	to	expose	the	pres-
ence	or	absence	of	that	connection,	but	if	we	alter	things	another	way,	
this	would	mask,	rather	than	test	for,	that	connection	(as	looking	at	the	
10:01-world	would	with	respect	to	Okay Clock).	
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are	often	motivated	by	explanatory	 intuitions	 is	 reinforced	by	Fine’s	
(m.s.)	 argument	 that	 a	 number	 of	 puzzles	 about	 impossible	worlds	
(including	some	about	proximity)	can	be	resolved	through	a	natural	
extension	of	his	truthmaker	framework.	Third,	it	is	no	coincidence	that	
‘truthmaker’	has	a	decidedly	explanatory	flavor.	Indeed,	a	good	deal	of	
recent	work	aims	to	get	clear	on	the	relationship	between	truthmaking	
and	grounding — contemporary	metaphysicians’	 favorite	 form	of	non-
causal	explanation.55
8.3 Closing Remarks
In	this	paper,	I	have	laid	the	groundwork	for	an	explanationist	account	
of	epistemic	coincidence	as	(at	least	one	aspect	of)	the	final	condition	
on	knowledge.	I	have	defended	Explanationist,	a	sufficient	explana-
tionist	condition	for	epistemic	coincidence,	and	argued	that	 there	 is	
hope	for	a	sufficient	explanationist	condition	for	avoiding	such	coinci-
dence.	I	now	conclude	where	my	interest	in	this	topic	began:	with	the	
Benacerraf	Problem’s	relatives	in	metaethics.56 
Especially	(though	not	exclusively)	 those	who	take	ethical	 truths	
to	be	necessary	and	mind-independent	are	understandably	puzzled	
about	how	we	gain	epistemic	access	to	those	truths.	A	helpful	way	to	
frame	their	puzzlement	is	by	asking:	If	our	ethical	beliefs	are	true,	how	
could	this	be	anything	other	 than	a	massive	coincidence?	Modalists	
reframe	this	as	the	question	of	whether	our	true	beliefs	would	remain	
true	across	a	sufficient	portion	of	modal	space.	But	this	is	not	the	same	
question,	as	Clarke-Doane’s	arguments	forcefully	show.	In	ethics,	the	
answer	to	this	question	may	well	be	"Yes,	because	if	we	somehow	get	
to	 teach	ethics	 is	 a	world	where	he	 teaches	 ethics	or	 teaches	metaphysics.	
Truthmaker	semantics,	by	contrast,	captures	the	difference	by	formalizing	the	
thought	that	every	option	that	fully	satisfies	(“makes	true”)	an	instruction	to	
teach	ethics	partly	satisfies	an	instruction	to	teach	ethics	and	teach	metaphys-
ics,	but	not	every	option	that	fully	satisfies	a	command	to	teach	ethics	or	teach	
metaphysics	even	partly	satisfies	a	command	to	teach	ethics,	since	one	such	
option	is	to	just	teach	metaphysics	(Fine	m.s.).
55.	 For	references,	see	Bliss	and	Trogdon	(2016,	§6.3).
56.	 For	a	useful	overview	of	such	relatives,	see	Schechter	(2017).
between	a	belief	and	the	truth	is	never	a	function	of	independent	facts	
about	them.
Given	these	points,	explanationists	find	themselves	in	the	enviable	
position	of	pursuing	an	analysis	of	knowledge	that	would	meet	Wil-
liamson’s	reasons	for	doubting	the	possibility	of	such	analyses	head-on.
8.2 Beyond Epistemology
In	my	 view,	 the	 problems	 that	 beset	modalism	 (and	 counterfactual-
ism),	and	speak	in	favor	of	explanationism,	are	not	limited	to	accounts	
of	 epistemic	 coincidence,	 nor	 even	 to	 epistemology.	 Modalist	 ac-
counts	are	popular	across	philosophy,	and	I	believe	that	many	of	them	
fall	prey	to	concerns	similar	to	those	discussed	here.	I	also	think	it	is	
no	surprise	that	these	problems	largely	go	unnoticed	until	their	impli-
cations	for	domains	like	mathematics	and	ethics	are	laid	bare.	Modal	
tests	are	elegant,	intuitive,	and	powerful,	while	explanation	is	exceed-
ingly	difficult	to	pin	down.
Rather	than	needlessly	stepping	on	toes	with	quick	dismissals	of	
various	modalisms,	I	will	briefly	discuss	a	positive	development	in	the	
area	where	modality	has	 arguably	been	most	 influential:	 semantics.	
An	alternative	form	of	truthmaker semantics	has	recently	been	gaining	
ground,	due	largely	to	the	work	of	Kit	Fine	(e.g.,	2014,	2017a,	2017b).	I	
won’t	go	into	the	complex	details	here,	but	just	offer	three	brief	com-
ments.	First,	there	are	parallels	between	my	contrast-based	argument	
against	modalism	and	the	fact	that	truthmaker	semantics	is	in	part	mo-
tivated	by	the	need	to	draw	distinctions	that	classical	modal	semantics	
cannot	capture.54	Second,	my	claim	that	appeals	to	impossible	worlds	
54.	Here	is	a	simple	example	from	the	logic	of	prescriptions:	if	Robert	instructs	
Kit	to	teach	ethics	and	teach	metaphysics,	it	seems	to	follow	that	he	has	also	
instructed	Kit	 to	 teach	 ethics;	 but	 if	 Robert	 instructs	Kit	 to	 teach	 ethics,	 it	
does	not	seem	to	follow	that	he	has	also	instructed	Kit	to	teach	ethics	or	teach	
metaphysics.	Classical	modal	 semantics	 cannot	 capture	 this	 difference,	 be-
cause	entailment	 is	 typically	understood	 in	 terms	of	 subsets:	A	entails	B	 if	
the	B-worlds	are	a	subset	of	the	A-worlds.	This	captures	the	first	judgement:	
every	world	where	Kit	follows	an	instruction	to	teach	ethics	and	teach	meta-
physics	is	a	world	where	he	teaches	ethics.	But	it	runs	afoul	of	the	second,	be-
cause	the	same	relation	holds:	every	world	where	Kit	follows	an	instruction	
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at	the	University	of	Helsinki,	as	well	as	to	the	editors	and	two	anony-
mous	referees	at	Philosophers’ Imprint.	Finally,	Extra	Super	Thanks	to	
Tristram	McPherson	and	Daniel	Wodak,	who	provided	comments	on	
an	unreasonable	number	of	drafts	and	discussed	this	project	with	me	
at	 length	 over	 the	 (hopefully	 not	 equally	 unreasonable)	 number	 of	
years	I’ve	been	working	on	it.
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